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I. INTRODUCTION AND THE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
For the past decade, the “joint democracy produces peace”
theory has received substantial attention. Evidence has confirmed
that democracies rarely, if ever, engage in large-scale conflicts with
each other. However, there is a lack of specific information regard-
ing the mixed dyads (democracies and non-democracies), especially
when we attempt to study their peace scenarios. Hence, some other
international relations scholars proclaim that even though the polit-
ical structures may be different between democracies and non-de-
mocracies, sharing similar interests provide certain strong
incentives for states to behave peacefully. Regime types may be in-
fluential, but under the mixed dyads scenario, states’ vital interests
have surpassed the importance of regime similarity. The most no-
ticeable example is the political and security competition being held
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) over Taiwan. The issue regarding Taiwan has been consist-
ently framed in terms of the stability between Beijing and Washing-
ton, D.C. Even though there were several diplomatic and
militarized disputes in the Taiwan Strait, the United States did not
take any military action against China in order to protect Taiwan.
Both Beijing and Washington share complex and interrelated na-
tional interests with each other—to maintain the security and sta-
bility of East Asia. Therefore, the leaders of these different regimes
think more carefully about their policy interests rather than only
focusing on their ideological differences.
Based on the argument above, it is an interesting question as to
whether we can apply this theoretical framework to the situation
between China and Taiwan. Since these two political entities belong
to two different regimes, and mainland China has no such intention
to become a more democratic regime, it seems that we are able to
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use the same structure of interest similarity to explain the current
cross-Strait scenario.
The study of states’ interest was derived from the debate be-
tween neorealism and neoliberalism because neorealists believe
that conflicts are more likely between states with different
worldviews.1 In particular, states’ interests such as security and eco-
nomics need to be considered when we study international conflict.2
When do states’ interests involving security and economics influ-
ence the choice to initiate conflict? These types of questions en-
courage scholars of international relations to study interests and
regime types together, and attempt to offer some advantages to en-
hance previous studies of conflict behavior.
Under the realists’ arguments, the explanation for democratic
peace theory is that a variety of cultural, social, ethnic, demo-
graphic, and political factors encourage Western industrial democ-
racies to view the world in similar ways. They do not fight each
other due to those similarities. Other studies also demonstrate that
interest indicators from realists and liberalists obtain statistically
significant results between interstate conflict and interests.3 In
short, interest creates more peace rather than the liberal variables.
Since the theoretical arguments in the type of regime cannot
adequately explain why China and Taiwan prefer heading to the
negotiation table rather than violent conflict, this paper is my at-
tempt to contribute a broader picture explaining why Beijing and
Taipei have been able to maintain peace since the 1950s. The causal
inference in this project articulates that the in-group/out-group dy-
namic increases animosity, and contributes to militarized conflict.
1. Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Polities and Peace,” International Security,
Vol. 20 no.2 (Fall 1995), p.123-146; and “Building Bridges Abroad,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 41 no.2 (April 1997), p. 455.
2. Christopher Layne, “Kant or Can’t: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 19 no.2 (Fall 1994), p.5-49. Douglas Lemke and William Reed,
“Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Demo-
cratic Peace,” International Interactions, Vol. 22 no.2 (April 1996) p.143-164.
3. Realists see alliance ties as a key indicator of shared strategic interests. Liberals
treat trade or IGO membership as the basic element of states’ interest affinity. Please
see Erik Gartzke, “Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the
Origins of the Democratic Peace,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42 no.1
(January 1998), p.1-27; and Erik Gartzke, “Preferences and the Democratic Peace,”
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44 no.2 (June 2000), p.191-212. Kevin J. Sweeny,
“The Severity of Interstate Disputes: Are Dyadic Capability Preponderances Really
More Pacific?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47 no.6 (December 2003), p.728-750.
Zeev Maoz et al, “Structural Equivalence and International Conflict: A Social Net-
works Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50 no.5 (October 2006), p.664.
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States will trust each other because they are “in-group.” “Out-
group” states are possibly less trusted. Therefore, trust brings situa-
tions that are more peaceful for states, but distrust may increase the
possibility of disputes. Interest similarity in this project means a
more general representation of ideological and institutional similar-
ities, which is different from what we recognize as the ordinary in-
compatible interests. The basic idea in this project is to elaborate
the effect of in-group and out-group ideas. States that attempt to
have similar views and ideas will be more likely to remain with each
other, and attempt to resolve disputes peacefully.
By applying the theoretical arguments on the studies of cross-
Strait relations, I suggest that deepening both security and eco-
nomic similarities boosts the political will to implement peace
agreements for the China-Taiwan dyad. Obstacles in the establish-
ment of a comprehensive cross-Strait dialogue include the increas-
ing Taiwanese identity of the Taiwanese people, and China’s
unwillingness to democratize. However, two critical principles, no-
tably security and economic issues, provide useful solutions for
opening up dialogue.
We should be aware that neither security nor economic inter-
ests alone will bring peace for China and Taiwan. This study does
not consider economic factors as the single principle component for
peace, which is more the exception rather than the norm in regards
to the Kantian peace theory. In contrast, I attempt to bring security
and economic issues together for a broader discussion of peace.
While economic convergence between China and Taiwan has grown
increasingly stronger, political divergence has not shown improve-
ment. This study, therefore, aims to identify the joint conditions of
interest similarities moving China and Taiwan to a less conflict-
prone scenario. A clear explanation about pacifying factors intro-
duced by both security and economic aspects offers strong contribu-
tions for the conditional peace across the Taiwan Strait.4
4. For instance, there have been different voices about the One China policy be-
tween Beijing and Taipei. Abiding by the One China ideal has become a critical issue to
prevent any further armed confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. For discussion about the
One China policy after 2008, please see Dean P. Chen, “The Strategic Implications of
MA Ying-jeou’s ‘One ROC, Two Areas’ Policy on Cross-Strait Relations,” American
Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol. 20 no.1 (April 2013), p.31-34. In fact, the consensus on
the One China policy could be viewed as a type of interest similarity. Consensus on this
policy (that Taipei does not abandon the One China policy, and Beijing’s continuous
willingness to “dispense benefits” to cross-Strait relations) can create positive impacts
across the Taiwan Strait.
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The research proceeds as follows. In the second section of this
monograph, I establish a framework explaining how I combine the
study of interest similarity and regime types into peace studies. I
elaborate this theoretical argument with an investigation of relevant
literatures, which has portrayed a need for more discussions regard-
ing how interests influence peace. States’ interest, as Russett and
O’Neal mentioned in their book, are also significant in the statisti-
cal analysis of interstate conflict.5 Therefore, it is necessary to in-
clude the discussions of interest, and also seriously think about its
independent effects on conflict behavior.
The third section attempts to provide a clear picture showing
how interest similarity causes peace while differences bring about
more conflicts. In order to solve the validity issues, it becomes more
important to select dyads with different qualifications, which can
show how policy similarities prevents militarized disputes. I have
selected two dyads for this demonstration: China-United States
(1949-1992), and Israel-Syria (1949-1992). By using the measures of
alliance similarity, which is more responsive to the intuition of im-
portant expressions of a states’ security concerns, this section offers
an important point that states’ security interests are closely con-
nected to the chance of the onset of conflict, as well as potential
escalation.
The last two sections bring the most important contributions to
this monograph. The fourth and fifth parts introduce more facts
about how security and economic concerns of China and Taiwan
affects peace. My goal is to prove my theoretical arguments while
providing a peaceful solution for the “untightening knots” in East
Asia. I believe that there are strong theoretical expectations for a
relationship between these two variables. My concern is that states
with similar global views will attempt to lower the tensions between
them.  Yet, it is valid to expect that a closer national affinity be-
tween China and Taiwan, even though they belong to two different
types of regimes, can create a long peaceful relationship. Finally,
this study of interest similarity offers a framework for the system-
atic study of relationships among different individuals, groups, or-
ganizations, and states that is eminently suitable for international
relations. The sixth section illustrates the rapidly growing resistance
against China’s economic coercion taking place in Taiwan, and in-
troduces the student protesting movement against the Cross-Strait
5. Bruce R. Russett and John R. O’Neal Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interde-
pendence, and International Organizations, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2001.
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Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). This section might reflect some
serious issues about Taiwan’s inconsistent interests between the ex-
ecutive branch and domestic politics. It then becomes more crucial
to solve this issue before Taiwanese representatives head to the ne-
gotiation table.
II. HOW INTEREST SIMILARITY CONTRIBUTES PEACE
The Kantian Triad has provided the study of international con-
flict with a very detailed and coherent feedback-loop theory. One
of its contributions in the study of international relations is the dis-
cussion about democratic peace theory. However, it is reasonable
to doubt whether there are other critical elements left behind the
scenes. This doubt comes from the previous debate between ne-
orealism and neoliberalism. Neorealism primarily refutes the claims
of a democratic peace.6 A neorealist’s view of international politics
focuses on power and interests, and the causal inferences of a
states’ conflict behavior stemming from their own interests.7 Hence,
the discussion of interests catches a scholars’ attention. Conflicts
are more likely to take place between nations that have greater dif-
ferences in world views than between those that see the world simi-
larly. The notion of state interests needs to be considered when we
focus on the theory of international conflict.8 The reasonable expla-
nation for democratic peace theory is that a variety of cultural, so-
6. Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of The Democratic Peace.” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 19 no. 2 (Summer 1994), p.5-49. Joanne S Gowa, Ballots and
Bullets, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
7. Classical realists mainly focus on the issue of interests and conflict. In Hans
Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism, he argues a balance of power will only
ensure peace when those involved in it have a common interest in its maintenance. For
Morgenthau, the concepts of power and interests are intertwined. Balance of power will
only be useful when the states in question share an interest in maintaining the status-
quo, and will be conflictual when the revision state is seeking to overthrow it. Please see
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New
York: Knop, 1967, p.20.
8. Realists see alliance ties as a key indicator of shared strategic interests. Liberals
treat trade or IGO membership as the basic element of states’ interest affinity. Please
see Erik Gartzke, “Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the
Origins of the Democratic Peace,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42 no.1
(March 1998), p.1-27; and Erik Gartzke, “Preferences and the Democratic Peace,” In-
ternational Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44 no.2 (June 2000), p.191-212. Kevin J. Sweeny,
“The Severity of Interstate Disputes: Are Dyadic Capability Preponderances Really
More Pacific?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47 no.6 (December 2003), p.728-750.
Zeev Maoz et al, “Structural Equivalence and International Conflict: A Social Net-
works Analysis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50 no.5 (October 2006), p.664.
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cial, ethnic, demographic, and political factors encourage the
Western industrial democracies to view the world in a similar way.
They do not fight each other simply due to those similarities. Schol-
ars of international conflict have long accepted that nations differ in
their objectives in global relations, and that these differences are an
important contributor to conflict behaviors.9
The debate between O’Neal, Russett and Gartzke is whether
interest itself directly causes conflict, or is the causal inference on
conflict indirectly attributable to democracy.10 In fact, the two stud-
ies both have shown a similar claim that states’ interests do matter,
and the relationship between interests and the probability of dis-
putes is causal.11 Both works have shown that the causal linkage
between interests and conflict is real, and we should not ignore
seeking out a broader theoretical and empirical explanation about
this causal linkage. Democracy matters in accounting for demo-
cratic peace, but there should be more variables accountable for
private domain of joint democracy. As Gartzke proposes: “we must
ask ourselves at some point whether other variables deserve greater
attention given the relatively modest portion of conflict behavior
that can be accounted for by pairing republics.”12 States’ interests
should not be merely an artifact of democracy (or other liberal vari-
ables) as O’Neal and Russett promote, and their effects on disputes
need to be studied using a more complex model revealing their di-
rect effects on conflict.
In order to investigate the debate between O’Neal and Russett
and Gartzke, scholars have to carefully parse the definition of inter-
ests before all the empirical examinations. Only via a thorough dis-
cussion of the definition of interests, can scholars identify the causal
linkage between interests and conflict because it should be clear
what role theoretical interpretation of policy interests play in moti-
9. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1983. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David D. Lalman, War and Reason: Domes-
tic and International Imperatives, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.
10. Bruce R. Russett and John R. O’Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interde-
pendence, and International Organizations, p.169.
11. What the author mentions about “states’ interests” is related to the state units,
not for governments or individual decision makers. Based on the debate between
O’Neal, Russett and Gartzke, their main argument attempts to reveal whether states’
interests are independent from regime types, which directly influence interstate conflict.
The analytical framework in this monograph relies on the state level, and may not have
a strong link with individual decision makers and governmental constraints by demo-
cratic institutions.
12. Erik Gartzke, “Preferences and the Democratic Peace,” p.210.
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vating states to use force. Some questions, however, need to be
asked prior to further examination. Could it really be the case that
the type of regime has more influence on peace than interests do?
Or, do interests and regime types hold equal explanatory power for
peace studies? It has been over twenty years since the question was
first posed, and there is still ambiguity. In this project, I argue that a
great deal of light can be shed on the question by including the
effects of an extra factor which is often focused on less by empirical
studies: interest. Scholars should not ignore the functions of inter-
ests in peace studies, or even treat this variable as the by-product of
liberal variables. In the empirical examination parts of this mono-
graph, I will demonstrate the direct effects interests have on peace
by using the cross-Strait relations as the case study. Even though
China and Taiwan belong to two different political regimes, and
there are strong doubts that China will become more democratic in
the future, scholars may need another theoretical framework to bet-
ter explain the current situation across the Taiwan Strait. A clear
concept about the content of states’ interests and their causal infer-
ences with regional peace is shown in the next section.
A. The Definitions of Interests
While the question of conceptualizing and operationalizing the
idea of interests has been proposed among international relations
scholars, there has not been as great a focus on how best to measure
interests, and distill them into a useful indicator. This is surprising
because interests have long been thought to be a critical element in
international conflict studies. As with the discussion of the demo-
cratic peace theory, I attempt to marry the conceptualization and
operationalization of this concept with the theory that scholars are
seeking to test. That is, we need to measure interests over potential
objectives, as interests will relate most explicitly to the questions of
international conflict.
The process of indicator construction needs to be guided by
theoretical discussion. Traditional scholars of international relations
studies merely have focused on security related interests.13 Also,
modern international relation scholars have continued to focus on
the issue with respect to the interests between types of states. The
13. Morgenthau also proposes “the concept of interest defined in terms of power.”
The main idea of interest can be explained by the level of power owned by each state.
States can reveal more national interests if they have stronger national power. Instead,
less powerful states have weaker capability for securing their basic need.
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power transition school argues that if states are satisfied with the
status-quo (they have no intention of overthrowing the existing sys-
tem), then there will not be military conflict even if the two states
reach parity in power.14 Scholars used to classify states into two cat-
egories with their revealed policy interests.15
We should be aware that the definition of national interest is a
“slippery concept,” which may require a more multi-dimensional
analysis rather than just an explanation of a single dimension.16 In-
terests usually combine not only security or material concerns, but
also certain moral and ethical ones. For example, with the end of
the Cold War, the need to find the power to serve American na-
tional security interests vanished due to the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The major national interest for the U.S. was to contain the
communist movement led by the Soviet Union during the Cold War
era. There might be some other new purpose for the United States
to adjust its role in contemporary times. Five vital interests are pro-
posed by the Commission on America’s National Interests, and it
explains that what the United States needs right now are not power
politics, but more moral and ethical values. Nye redefines the core
value of interests with three different lists of threats to American
foreign policy.17 He does not try to confuse us about the substance
14. Their discussion reiterates the dichotomization of status quo and revisionist
powers. Moravcsik offers a similar dichotomy when he argues in his article, “In other
words, intense conflict requires that an aggressor or revisionist state advance demands
to which other states are unwilling to submit.” Please see Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organ-
ization, Vol. 51 no.6 (December 1997), p.513-54.
15. However, this dichotomy has several problems, which obscures the true defini-
tion of interests. First, there are very few purely revisionist or status-quo states in inter-
national society. States may switch their policy attitudes from time to time, which
means they probably will adopt a mix of revisionist and status-quo strategies. Second, as
we combine the types of states and conflict occurrence, it provides some inconsistent
results for the studies. The typology provides determinate expectations of conflict only
for the pair of status-quo states, but not for the revisionist pairs. Two revisionist states
may sometimes seek a common goal and attempt to avoid conflict, but they also have
intentions to differ with respect to both means and ends, which will lead to final con-
flict. Based on these two arguments above, the type of national preferences should be
investigated with more effort when we use states’ satisfaction with their international
status.
16. Joseph Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, Vol 78 no. 4
(July/ August 1999), p.22-35.
17. In Nye’s idea, the “C list” threat reflects an indirect influence on America’s
survival, but dominantly occupy U.S. foreign policy decision. In Nye’s explanations, the
“A list” are the threats that the Soviet Union presented to U.S. survival. The “B list”
features the imminent threats to U.S. interests, and the “C list” includes the contingen-
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of states’ interests. Instead, he informs us that interests are not re-
vealed solely by the formation of power or security, but also in-
cludes economic or institutional concerns.
Another issue that requires more clarification is a general
problem with this area of research, both factor and correlational
analysis, which teach us that interests are somehow interrelated.
For example, states’ security and economic attitudes are inter-
twined with each other, and both should be recognized as the re-
sults of an ideology. Gilpin discusses this complementarity in his
book, War and Change in World Politics. He says international
politics is not influenced by security or political issues alone, and
changes in the distribution of power also influence global economic
relations.18 Gowa concords with Gilpin’s argument, and proposes
that foreign economic policy is driven by both security and material
policy while security policies have wealth externalities.19 Keohane
later provides an example on how American military power was
used to build international economic arrangements consistent with
American capitalism in the 1940s.20 This economic dependence be-
tween the United States, Western Europe, and Japan also increased
the United States’ long term military strength. In Keohane’s discus-
sion, the link between “power” and “wealth” of U.S. interests was
consistently linked, and there should be no priority for either
“power” or “wealth.” In general, U.S. economic interests abroad
depended on establishing a political environment in which capital-
ism could flourish, and the U.S. political or security value depended
on the economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan. This case
cies that indirectly affect U.S. security but do not directly threaten U.S. interest. Please
see Nye, “Redefining the National Interest.”
18. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press, 1983.
19. Previous theories can assist us in creating an analytical framework explaining
the basic concept of interests. The focus on national security corresponds to some of the
realists’ basic arguments about national survival, and the economic domain reflects ne-
oliberals’ counter arguments about attention to states’ trade behavior. Trade might be
considered a fairly common expression of national interests, but a few factors make it
less than appealing, because two states engaging in trade does not imply that they agree
on everything in the foreign policy realm. Nations that trade must overcome the trans-
action associated with commerce, and their domestic situation must accommodate the
international financial system, which follows globalization. Trade brings an additional
economic aspect to describe states’ interests in the recent study. Please see Joanne S.
Gowa, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade,” American Political Science Review,
Vol. 83 no.4 (August 1989), p.1245-1256.
20. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Press, 2005.
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reflects how U.S. national security and economic foreign policies
are tightly linked.21
While there is a general consensus that interests are interre-
lated, few authors have paid much attention to the questions of why
and how they are related. And while there seems to be general
agreement that states’ interests are multi-dimensional, there is very
little discussion about the categories for the framework. The recent
work in this area has been encouraging, and has demonstrated the
lack of research on the issue of interrelation. A great deal more
needs to be done to correctly to determine how and why specific
states’ interests are linked together.
Determining the starting point in evaluating the specific mean-
ing of interests is extremely difficult. Since there are numerous
dimensions for conceptualizing the main idea, I will settle for the
less ambitious goal of providing a precise definition of interests with
more theories.
I define interests as the extent to which states attempt to main-
tain their basic requirements for survival, which refers to their con-
trol for vital interests.22 Liberals criticized that nations do not only
care about security issues for their vital interests, as realists argue,
but also other interests related to the economy or social welfare.23
The discussions between neoliberals and neorealists, thus, tell us
that the prioritized goal of a state is to survive through both na-
tional security and economic welfare.24
Scholars should seek out the elements of policy concerns, and
diagnose the relationship among the latent concepts and manifest
21. Economic interdependence creates peace among Asian countries. In Asia, the
U.S. provided the collective goods and free access to its vast market to Asia’s early
industrializers. It created rapid economic growth in several Asian countries, such as
Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. These countries also represent U.S. political and dem-
ocratic value in East Asia.
22. The reason I adopt security and economic interests as vital interests is because
states will struggle to secure their political or economic benefits if they can foresee the
danger. Other minor interests, which create no immediate harm to a nation’s survival,
are not viewed as vital interests in this project.
23. For instance, Lipson believes that international cooperation is more likely in
economic related areas than in the security domain. See Charles Lipson, “International
Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World Politics, Vol. 37 no. 1 (February
1999), p.1-23.
24. States will definitely fight for their core interests, such as territorial invasion,
attacks by the weapons of mass destruction, or loss of financial markets or energy sup-
ply. Since this project is focusing on the relationship among interests and interstate
conflicts, it still provides reliability if we can ignore some minor or secondary national
interests.
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indicators we observe. As I argue above, security and economic
concerns can be identified as certain latent factors. First, the con-
cerns for security issues are typically assessed by examining charac-
teristics of the national military or diplomatic capability of the
states. States have intentions to pursue more alliance coalitions for
security reasons, stronger military capabilities for national defense,
the specific voting behaviors in the United Nations demonstrating
their foreign policies, or even the requisition of nuclear weapons for
deterrence. The higher the level of security interests in a country,
the more we expect these actions to be present in the state. In fact,
the desire for more security capabilities has been the top priority
for most states.
Economic interests refer to the elements emphasized by politi-
cal economists, which arguably play very important roles in main-
taining world order under examination. Several important elements
can be put into the consideration of economic interests, such as
trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), monetary policy, and mar-
ket openness. States putting more emphasis on economic or social
welfare will strongly stress these issues. For instance, after the eco-
nomic reform in the late 1970s, China has shown an average annual
rate of more than 9 percent for almost a quarter of a century.
China’s economic success can be attributed to its policy considera-
tion on the huge amount of international trade, foreign direct in-
vestment, and strong market-economy. Not only China, but also
other newly industrialized countries, will treat trade and other eco-
nomic issues as their major policy concerns. One linkage connecting
economic concerns with states’ behavior is how economic interde-
pendence brings more peace. Even though the majority of scholars
agree that trade brings more peace,25 there is still some ongoing
debate over whether trade contributes to international conflict.26 In
25. John R. O’Neal and James Lee Ray, “ New Test of the Democratic Peace Con-
trolling for Economic Interdependence, 1950-1985,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol.
50 no. 4 (December 1997), p. 751-775. John R. O’Neal and Bruce M. Russett, “Assess-
ing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduce Conflicts,”
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36 no. 4 (August 1999), p.423-442.
26. Liberals argue that trade promotes peace, since the fear of losing commerce
causes political decision makers to refrain from engaging in war with important trading
partners. Russett and O’Neal’s results prove this argument. Liberal and realist theories
of interdependence and conflict agree that trade between states will cease once they are
engaged in serious forms of conflict with each other. Barbieri and Levy, in contrast,
provide a different result from their work. They argue that trade ties do not always
deter war, because war does not significantly harm trading partners. Their findings are
interesting and compelling while I believe more hypotheses testing and data collecting
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addition to trade, Gartzke’s empirical evidence has informed us
that it is the financial markets and monetary integration together
that creates peace among states.27 The reason is that global inves-
tors will prevent any possible risk, and seek more stable and open
local markets for investment. Therefore, it becomes the state lead-
ers’ priority to provide a stable and safe environment for all partici-
pants. Gartzke’s ideas offer a critical and useful theoretical
background for us to integrate market openness and monetary inte-
gration into the states’ economic objectives.
B. The Theoretical Assumptions
Theories in this project argue that states fight because of their
opposing opinions and ideas on international issues. One thing
should be mentioned prior to the following discussions: I do not
focus on a specific dispute or contest over a certain geographic loca-
tion or resources; these are viewed as incompatible interests be-
cause states (or leaders) will definitely fight for those incompatible
interests. Incompatible interests have strong links to a leaders’ sur-
vival, and no leader will sacrifice these incompatible interests to
other countries if they value their own survival. Interest similarity
in this project, therefore, means a more overall representation of
ideological and policy closeness, which is different from what we
recognize as ordinary incompatible interests.
One of the issues that Russett and Gartzke do not clearly ad-
dress is the explanation of why interest similarity will bring about
less conflict between states. In order to advance our understanding
of the cause of world peace through common interests, the interest
similarity argument analyzes the expectations from the most impor-
tant theories regarding the onset of conflict and conflict escala-
tion.28 This argument contends that institutions and the policy
influenced by the regime structures usefully delineate friends from
foes in the international arena, and in this manner, they influence
foreign policy preferences and the likelihood of international con-
can be added into the trade disruption issue. Please see Katherine Barbieri and Jack S.
Levy, “Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade,” Journal of Peace Re-
search, Vol. 36 no. 4, (August 1999), p.463-479.
27. Erick Gartzke and Quan Li, “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Polit-
ical Externalities of Economic Globalization,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47
no.4 (December 2003), p.561-586.
28. Suzanne Werner and Douglas Lemke, “Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact
of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices,” Inter-
national Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41 no. 3 (September 1997), p. 529-546.
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flicts. Actually, the theoretical logic follows Hermann and Kegley’s
social identity theory, in which they believe that “those in the in-
groups can be trusted because they are similar; those in the out-
groups are distrusted because they are different and hostile.”29 Her-
mann and Kegley offer a psychological explanation of world peace,
which assumes that the composition of one’s in-group/out-group dy-
namics will influence perceptions of other states.
One of the recommendations here is to adopt the idea of in-
group and out-group dynamics as the central mechanism with the
extension of how different types of interests influence a states con-
flict behavior. We might expect, then, that states with similar policy
interests will tend to view each other more as in-group members,
and perceive those states with similar interests as friends instead of
enemies. The perceived affinity and affiliation within a coalescing
in-group is prone to include those who subscribe to similar foreign
policies and institutions. However, states are more likely to be
treated as out-group members if they share different interests.30
The reason why in-group/out-group dynamics increase the pos-
sibility of conflict is because this clear social identification will in-
crease animosity between states, which will lead to interstate
conflict. This distinction leads to the separation of different states,
and animosity will easily increase among the states with different
ideologies once these separated actors miscommunicate or a misun-
derstanding occurs. High levels of animosity will decrease trust,
making it more difficult for two parties to resolve any dispute. This
gives us a strong basis for why the psychological effects of in-group/
out-group dynamics will bring about more conflicts between states.
Based on the theoretical arguments above, I introduce my first
assumption:
Assumption 1: States in a dyad with similar policy interests
are less likely to have militarized disputes.
In essence, then, the next task here is to investigate security
similarities, one of the major categories of national interests, and
discuss why it brings about more peace among states. Scholars from
29. Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley Jr, “Rethinking Democracy and
International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology,” International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 39 no.4 (December 1995), p.511-533.
30. The basic assumption from the social identity theory clearly points out that in-
group/out-group dynamics have an influential identity framework. People are more ac-
cepting of those who are familiar and similar, but they distance themselves from those
who are dissimilar and less familiar.
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diverse intellectual traditions have agreed that states’ security inter-
ests vary, and that variation in these interests is a major determi-
nant of interstate conflict. Theoretical arguments connecting
security interests and severe interstate conflict suggest that interests
are key to the explanation but limited in an important way. This
limitation is that there is a tendency to characterize states as either
status quo or revisionist, and these two types of states, based on
their interests and then deriving conflict expectation from this di-
chotomy, is famous on the literature.
In fact, the major concept in the social identity theory reveals
the impact of a states’ image and beliefs about the enemy and con-
siderations of social identity. Political-physiological research seeks
to explain why people engage in conflict, and the research suggests
that images of the enemy cause states to insulate themselves from
the adversary, and create negative attributes to such a group or na-
tion. As Hermann and Kegley argue, “These ‘others’ can do no
right and are motivated to make ‘our’ lives more difficult.”31 Social
identity theorists provide us with information about how people be-
gin to expand their definitions of who belongs in “their groups” (or
“in-group” members), and to readjust the nature of the enemy (or
“out-group” members).
This study, thus, adopts a novel argument connecting realists’
ideas on status-quo power and revisionists with social identity the-
ory. When combining these two traditional theories, we are able to
discover some useful links between these traditional arguments.
Countries seen as revisionists mainly seek to overthrow the current
stable system and try to alter the existing order; however, status-
quo powers basically seek to maintain the current distribution of
power in the international system. Thus, these two types of states
are almost exclusive to each other, and realists expect the most se-
vere interstate conflicts to occur between these two groups. Status-
quo states, which are viewed as having similar security interests for
peace, are more likely to stay together and unite a close group.
Within the group, members unanimously accept the framework of
international order, and these satisfactions help maintain stability
between group members. Revisionists share dissimilar security in-
terests with status-quo powers, and will be insulated as more
outside members. Kissinger’s study of the Concert of Europe offers
an appropriate case for the argument. Kissinger holds that the
31. Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley Jr, “Rethinking Democracy and
International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology,” p.516.
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cause of peace was not that in the wake of the Napoleonic wars
most of European great powers had similar national capability; it
was the similar security interests in maintaining status quo in Eu-
rope.32 The idea of similar security in maintaining status-quo suc-
cessfully organized most European great powers, and created
alliances to counterbalance Napoleon. It was Europe’s great for-
tune that no such revolutionary powers existed in Europe after the
defeat of Napoleonic France. Stability was possible because those
in-group members had common security convictions. The case of
counterbalancing Napoleon and the arguments above lead to the
second assumption:
Assumption 2: States in a dyad are less likely to have
militarized disputes if they share similar security interests.
Up until the end of the Cold War, “states’ interests” always
focused on the military defense of the state. The two major interna-
tional relations paradigms—realism and liberalism—both go on to
explain international interactions as the result of relevant actors us-
ing their power to pursue their interests. The rise of comprehensive
interests, however, represents a major shift away from the centrality
of security aspects into two other directions: a shift toward the
larger community of interests, and the shift to concerns about the
forces of global economic interests. As Keohane and Nye have
pointed out, national survival does not only depend on the nation’s
ability to sustain its military capability, but more importantly, on
the globalization of the world economy beyond the stage of com-
plex interdependence.33
States rely on trade and economic activities in international so-
ciety. Theoretical arguments inform us that trade influences foreign
policy because military conflicts will generate huge opportunity
costs. O’Neal and Russett stated that, “Policymakers avoid the use
of force against states with which they engage in economically im-
portant trade.”34 Countries that rely more heavily on international
trade will suffer more losses if they engage in violent disputes with
their trading partners. The cost of conflict will be so high that
32. Henry Kissinger, The Trouble Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alli-
ance, Council on Foreign Relations, 1964.
33. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World
Politics in Transition, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977.
34. John R. O’Neal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Bene-
fits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992,”
World Politics, Vol. 52 no. 1 (February 1999), p. 1-37.
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policymakers will hesitate to initiate military activities. This phe-
nomenon exists not only among democratic countries; peace exists
among any type of government once they have strong economic re-
lations. Increased economic involvement between states leads to
more peaceful international order due to the increased opportunity
costs of conflict, which deters nations with different regime types
from military expansion.35
Economic interest is far more complex than we might imagine.
It reflects not only the amount of imports or exports between two
countries, but also the regulations of market openness and mone-
tary policy. A more open financial market and integrated monetary
structure will promote more peace between states.36 Indeed, com-
mercial interests can strengthen collective ideas about mutual inter-
ests and group security. States with common economic interests will
have a more identical sense of what constitutes stable global order
and also have mutual economic benefits. It is difficult for states to
harm their economy by violating trade patterns and mutual com-
mercial benefits with those economic partners. Thus, the idea of
common economic interests creates a reasonable explanation for
peaceful foreign policy among different types of states.
Assumption 3: States in a dyad are less likely to have
militarized disputes if they share similar economic interests.
III. ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF DYADIC INTEREST
SIMILARITY IN HISTORY
It is difficult to confirm the validity of the operationalizations
of dyadic interest similarity because the concept is so abstract that
scholars fail to obtain concrete measurements. In order to
strengthen my theoretical arguments, I plan to utilize two ‘high pro-
file’ dyads, by which scholars can prove the variation with a more
intuitive sense of how this variable changes over temporal and spa-
tial domains. In particular, it is important to select dyads with dif-
ferent qualifications, which can show how common interests
prevent conflict escalating to war between states. I have chosen two
dyads for this demonstration: China-United States (1949-1992), and
35. Mark Souva and Brandon Prins, “The Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role of
Democracy, Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initia-
tion, 1950-1999,” International Interactions, Vol. 32 no. 2 (April 2006), p.183-200.
36. Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 51 no. 1 (February 2007), p.166-191.
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Israel-Syria (1949-1992). This paper will focus mostly on the first
dyad because of its overwhelming diplomatic and political impor-
tance. The other dyad will show the correspondence of my theoreti-
cal arguments with events for non-Great Power dyads.
A. The China-United States Dyad
The Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship has improved tremen-
dously since the 1960s due to strong interest similarities. It gives us
a successful case of how common interests can decrease conflict es-
calation. Figure 1 describes the time series of the level of security
affinity between China and the United States from 1949 to 1992.
The higher scores on this variable represent perfect security prefer-
ences while lower scores indicate perfect interests dissimilarity. For
example, we can notice that most of the higher levels of the variable
are generally after Kissinger visited Beijing in 1972, at the time
when Nixon decided to normalize America’s relation with China.
The lower values of interest similarities are found when the CHI-
ANG Kai-shek administration withdrew from mainland China and
became Taiwan with the assistance of the U.S. military. A more de-
tailed discussion found later in the paper offers even stronger sup-
port for the validity of this variable.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded during the
Cold War era. Two camps were in sharp contention at that time,
with China aligned initially with the Soviet Union against the
United States.37 From Figure 1, we can see that the security prefer-
ences drop dramatically after 1949. Antagonism, thus, served the
purposes of leaders in China and the U.S. better than conciliation.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao, who was focus-
ing on eradicating American imperialism and pro-American senti-
ment, attempted to realize international communist solidarity. He
also adopted a more pro-Soviet Union foreign policy, which eventu-
ally resulted in the bloody Korean War in 1950. Actually, both
China and the U.S. adopted hostile images against each other, and
their overall interests of security policies were in sharp contrast.
Meanwhile, more militarized conflicts (or war) occurred after the
Korean War. Three conflicts within the Taiwan Strait, which were
37. In 1960, the “opposition to imperialism, revisionism and reactionaries” became
the principal guideline for Chinese foreign policy. China opposed the Soviet Union’s
revisionism as well as American imperialism. In 1970, Beijing started to gather a great
deal of power, and tried to divide international politics into three worlds. Different
from the super powers and developed countries, China defined itself as a developing
country, and tried to play the leading role among the so-called “third world.”
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related to sovereignty claims after an incomplete Chinese civil war,
triggered the violent clashes from 1954 to 1962. CHIANG Kai-
shek’s military forces obtained U.S. security help, and successfully
resisted the harassment and attacks from Chinese communists.
Even though there was no direct militarized confrontation between
the PRC and the U.S. at that time, several studies have already rec-
ognized that the militarized disputes fought between CHIANG
Kai-shek’s Kuomintang and Mao’s CCP belong to a war between
the PRC and the U.S.38
The Vietnam War also elevated tensions and hostilities be-
tween China and the United States. Washington recognized that
China was offering valuable resources to HO Chi Minh, but in or-
der to prevent a reprise of the bloody confrontation in Korea, the
U.S. only openly attacked Chinese soldiers who crossed the border.
China, at that time, mainly provided military supplies to support its
frontier, to strengthen an ideological fortress, and to build credibil-
ity as the leader of the “third world.”39 The dyadic index of interest
similarity between China and the United States maintained a low
level throughout the late 1950s.
Figure 1: China-U.S. Interest Similarity and Militarized Conflicts
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38. COW data set has included the United States into the war between KMT and
CCP.
39. Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold
War, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2012.
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The Sino-U.S. relations improved somewhat during the early
1960s, possibly due to the Cuban missile crisis, which actualized the
danger of conflict to both the Soviet Union and the United States.
Also, the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and China
started to deteriorate in the late 1950s, and this trend subtly
changed the triangular relationship of the U.S., China, and the So-
viet Union. Washington sought to use the common opposition with
Beijing against Moscow rather than continuing to contain China.
Both China and the U.S. believed that normalization of bilateral
relations would benefit each other geopolitically and strategically.
China anticipated the end of U.S. support for the CHIANG Kai-
shek’s administration and its entrance into the United Nations.40
Mao also wanted the U.S. on China’s side as the Sino-Soviet rift
became bigger, and Moscow would not dare attack China. The U.S.
also expected that a strong China would serve U.S. interests—a
prosperous and stable society in East Asia. Washington, in addition,
hoped that normalization would help to end the Vietnam War and
strengthen the U.S.’s position in Asia. This is the reason why the
bilateral interest similarity marks the beginning of a general in-
crease in Figure 1.
Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in 1971, and the signing of the Shang-
hai Communique in 1972, explicitly explains the highest scores of
dyadic interest similarity between China and the U.S. since 1949.
Nixon’s major concern for normalizing the relations with Beijing
was to end the Vietnam War, and to stabilize East Asia. The U.S.
seemed determined to withdraw from its past policy of containing
China in Asia, and thereby ending a perceived threat to China’s
national security.41 This process was also complemented by strong
Chinese national interests, under the post-Mao period in pragmatic
economic modernization, which emphasized the importance of fi-
nancial and technical support from the West.
The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 marked a change in
America’s foreign policy towards China, particularly with Zbigniew
Brzezinski taking over as National Security Adviser. Several
40. In the 1950s and 1960s, China rejected nominal multilateralism because of na-
tional security concerns and fear of imperialism.  However, in 1970, the third world
theory allowed for China’s involvement in international organizations. The substitution
of the PRC for ROC in the United Nations was the main reason for the PRC to take
part in international organizations. But it was only in nominal, not quantitative,
multilateralism.
41. Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold
War.
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stances the Carter Administration took in regards to foreign policy
proved this shift in policy. Brzezinski intended to play the “China
card” against the Soviet Union in Africa, the Middle East, and in
arms control.42 In fact, Brzezinski did not look for a simple diplo-
matic accommodation, but he wanted military ties. According to
Tucker:
The Carter administration sold Beijing weapons tech-
nology and wherever the U.S. could not make a sale,
Brzezinski proved willing to find a European supplier. The
administration also provided the Chinese with intelligence
regarding Soviet troop deployments and military facilities,
and sought China’s agreement to host a monitoring station
in Xinjiang to replace facilities lost to the Iranian
revolution.43
The statement above reveals that a strong and cooperative
Sino-U.S. relationship would promote U.S. security interests. Also,
a high degree of interest similarity offers a low possibility of severe
disputes between these two countries.
The Sino-U.S. relation did not always maintain a high level of
harmony between the 1970s and the 1980s. The United States Con-
gress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, which seemed to
compensate for the losses of formal diplomatic relations between
the U.S. and the Taiwanese government. The informal Taiwan-U.S.
interaction, according to the Taiwan Relations Act, provided the
mechanisms for sustained defensive weapons sales and potential
U.S. security aid in the event of an attack. This did not serve as an
ideal interest for the DENG Xiaoping administration, and dropped
the Sino-U.S. similarity scores. Beijing searched for opportunities
to resolve the troubling Taiwan issue, including the signing of the
Joint Communique´ in August 17, 1982 (817 Communique´). In this
communique´, the U.S. government literally agreed to reduce and to
ultimately eliminate U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.44 However, Presi-
dent Reagan ultimately gave Taiwan “Six Assurances” after he
signed the Joint Communique´ with Beijing. These six assurances
declared that Washington had not set a date for ending arms sales,
and would not consult Beijing prior to sales. Generally speaking,
42. Nancy B. Tucker, “The Evolution of U.S.-China Relations.” In Tangled Titans,
ed. David Shambaugh, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2013.
43. Ibid., p.36.
44. Reagan was more sympathetic to Taiwan, and talked about restoring diplomatic
relations with Taiwan during his campaign.
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although the 817 Communique´ was signed between China and the
U.S., it did not successfully depict a concord policy similarity as
shown in Figure 1.
Beijing and Washington have maintained a stable and harmo-
nious relationship since the early 1970s with only minor disagree-
ments on some foreign policy decisions. In general, the two powers
have not experienced any major diplomatic nor militarized confron-
tations. The Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 shattered the U.S. na-
tional consensus on the merits and importance of ties with China.
The image of the brutal massacre strongly contradicted China’s rep-
utation at the time. American belief in a liberalizing and democra-
tizing China decreased suddenly. Meanwhile, with Sino-Soviet
reconciliation, the strategic rationale for a U.S.-China rapproche-
ment crumbled and revealed the huge differences in cultural, politi-
cal, and security interests. This is the reason we see a huge drop in
their interest similarity scores, as indicated in Figure 1. Because of
rapid economic interdependence and close trade network, Ameri-
can and European investors returned to China attracted by the
growth stimulated by DENG Xiaoping’s 1992 “southern journey.”
Economic incentives once again caught politician’s eyes, and pulled
bilateral relations back to the normal standard.
This section has clearly demonstrated that the operational
measures of the key variable validly reflect the underlying concepts
of dyadic interest similarity for the China-U.S. dyad. The measure
rises and falls in response to changes in interests made by either
state that had a material effect on its policy preferences. In particu-
lar, the measure is more responsive to our intuition of important
expressions of national security interests. Not only does the mea-
sure clearly indicate the low points in China-Soviet cooperation
(the Korean War, the 2nd Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the Vietnam
War), but it seems responsive to even slight preference shifts that
other indicators could not fully cover. Additionally, the measure of-
fers a clear picture illustrating the basic bilateral relation between
interest similarity and war scenarios for the two major powers. As
similarities increase, the chances of intensive rivalries or conflict es-
calation decrease as see in Figure 1. After China and the U.S. nor-
malized their relationship, both sides attempted to mitigate intense
situations, and even prevented potential conflict from escalating to
large scale war. The next section will briefly investigate the measure
in other dyads (non-Great Power) to further establish the indicator,
which can be applied to more than just the China-U.S. dyad.
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B. The Israel-Syria Dyad
As seen in the previous case, the closer the interests are, the
less conflict might escalate. In this section, I use a non-Great Power
dyad to support the theoretical argument. Figure 2 displays the time
series for the interest similarity variable in the two Middle East Dy-
ads, and this variable fits the theory well. It is not necessary to cre-
ate a list and describe all the events in detail, but a few points can
help us to understand this phenomenon. First, historically, the
Israel-Syria dyad was never quite at peace. These two countries
have struggled over territory as well as other political issues for sev-
eral decades. The Israelis spent most of the time attempting to
maintain their security interests and isolating the Arab minority
within their borders. As Figure 2 shows, the situation of dyadic in-
terest similarity for these two countries went from bad to worse (a
downturn slope). Two well known violent incidents will be utilized
for the case here. First, during the Six Days War in 1967, the Israeli
military took over the West Bank of the Jordan River from Jordan,
and the Golan Heights from Syria after several clashes along the
border. This militarized conflict and interest confrontation between
the Israeli and Syrian governments deteriorated the bilateral rela-
tions and ultimately led to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. During the
war, Syria and Egypt launched a coordinated attack, and tempora-
rily recovered areas lost in the Six Days War. However, Israel coun-
tered and retook their earlier losses, and a temporary peace was
created by the United States and the Soviet Union. The diverse
preferences for the Israel-Syria dyad created violent and bloody
disputes in the region.
The second issue that needs to be mentioned here is the Israeli
and Syrian confrontation in the 1970 Jordan Civil War. According
to Huth, it is a typical case of policy dissimilarity between the Israeli
and Syrian governments, which encouraged both countries to pre-
pare for escalating disputes.45 In fact, Syria backed the Palestinian
rebels, the fedayeen, while the United States and Israel backed the
King of Jordan. According to Israeli Prime Minister Allon,
“. . .Israel would follow developments there [in Jordan] very closely
in order to protect Israel’s legitimate security interests.”46 It was
Israel’s ideal interest to ensure that the moderate King Hussein
would not be replaced by a more militant regime, for instance, the
45. Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, New Haven, CT:
Princeton University Press, 1988.
46. Ibid.
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leaders of the fedayeen. In contrast, the Syrian regime, headed by
President Nureddin al-Atasi, was a strong supporter of the rebels
and opposed King Hussein. The threat of Israeli intervention even-
tually played a critical role in Syria’s decision to withdraw from
northern Jordan in the same year.
The most prominent point in this dyad should include the dis-
cussions about both parties’ struggles in Lebanon. Syria entered the
Lebanese Civil War in 1976 to assist the side of the Palestinians,
and the Christians in Lebanon later on obtained the support from
the Israeli military. The militarized disputes have waxed and waned
since then, which has destabilized the region. Both Syrians and Is-
raelis have constantly supported different factors in order to main-
tain their interests there, and have prevented the other from
gaining control. Even the 1979 Camp David Accords did not pro-
vide any pacifying effects on the dyadic conflict situation. In sum,
the Israel-Syria dyad provides a contrast to the Sino-U.S. dyad: a
dyad with dissimilar interests in which even minor disputes raise the
possibility of dramatic escalation. From the two cases illustrated
above, this measure of dyadic interest similarity gives us validity in
a wide range of interstate dyads.
Figure 2: Israel-Syria Interest Similarity and Militarized Conflicts
1949-1992
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IV. COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS BETWEEN CHINA
AND TAIWAN
Scholars of international relations argue that two types of
states exist in the international system, and whichever type a state
aligns with clearly explains that states basic security concerns. This
typology characterizes states as either status quo or revisionist, with
these definitions basing their interests on international security and
then deriving conflict expectation from this dichotomy.47 By apply-
ing the definitions and investigating the results of security similarity
through the discussion of maintaining the status-quo scenario, we
discover that status quo brought about longer peace for the Taiwan
Strait. As Taiwan transitioned to democracy, advocacy for Taiwan
independence became more vocal. Conversely, China views de jure
independence for Taiwan as unacceptable, and warns Taiwan re-
peatedly that a declaration of independence will leave China no
choice but to attack Taiwan. China even passed an anti-secession
law to show its determination against any move by Taiwan in that
direction.48 Therefore, the evidence above shows that de jure inde-
pendence may lead to an unavoidable war.
On the island, public opinion on political association between
Taiwan and China is much more complicated: some advocate for
Taiwan’s independence; some believe that Taiwan and the mainland
should be reunified sooner or later; and there are others (often a
majority or close to a majority in the polls) who feel that the status
quo (or de facto independence) which is neither de jure indepen-
dence nor unification, may be the best option for Taiwan under the
current circumstances.49
47. Morgenthau called them imperialistic and status-quo powers. Hans J. Morgen-
thau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Moravcsik also offers
a similar dichotomy on these two types of states, including revisionist or status-quo
states. The clear dichotomy can also be seen in realist literature. Please see Andrew
Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.”
48. See Ji You, “China’s Anti-Secession Law and the Risk of War in the Taiwan
Strait,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 27 no.2 (Fall 2006), p.237-257. Robert S.
Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement,” Foreign Affairs (2006), p.141-148.
49. For the issue of Taiwanese public opinion on the independence or unification,
see John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Emerson M.S. Niou, “Measuring Taiwanese Public
Opinion on the Taiwan Independence Issue: A Methodological Note,” China Quarterly,
Vol 181 no.1 (March 2005), p.158-168. Ever since the establishment of the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan, the unification versus independence question not
only has been one of the primary issues by which political parties in Taiwan distinguish
themselves from one another, but it has also been the dominant factor in affecting vote
choice. See John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Emerson M. S. Niou, “Salient Issues in Taiwan’s
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Strictly speaking, both unification and independence represent
change from the status quo. However, as far as China is concerned,
unification is a desirable goal, and it will definitely not take military
action against Taiwan if the latter so desires. It is de jure indepen-
dence that will prompt China to take drastic actions against the is-
land. However, previous Chinese leaders could not adopt any
provocative or active movement to reunite Taiwan, since the U.S.
still provides security support for Taiwan. Even though the main-
land’s policy relative to Taiwan is often viewed as separate from its
broader foreign-policy orientation, there is evidence showing that
preferences for restraint and maintenance of the status quo are be-
ginning to shape cross-Strait relations. Previous Chinese leader, HU
Jintao, realized that the chance of unification between China and
Taiwan was slim during his term, and he downplayed the traditional
strategy toward cross-Strait relations while increasing the mainte-
nance of the status quo and economic cooperation with Taiwan.50
For instance, HU Jintao’s proposal after the “Economic Coopera-
tion Framework Agreement” (ECFA) showed a willingness to sign
the “Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement” (CECA)
with Taipei, and to seek ways to link cross-Strait common develop-
ment with Asia-Pacific economic integration. In general, as long as
Taiwan does not force China to use coercive power by declaring
independence, leaders in Beijing prefer a more peaceful strategy
that leaves open the possibility of unification at some indefinite
point in the future.51 The major security preference for the current
cross-Strait relations still remains on status quo track, and maintain-
ing the status quo will bring continued stability and manageable sit-
uations across the strait.
In order to examine the argument of security similarity’s effect
on peace, I will further analyze three major China-Taiwan cases.
The first case is the 1995-96 Taiwan missile crisis. The second one is
President MA Ying-jeou’s mainland policy and how he attempts to
Electoral Politics,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 15 no.2 (Fall 1996), p.219-230; Tse-min Lin,
Yun-han Chu, & Melvin J. Hinich, “A Spatial Analysis of Political Competition in Tai-
wan,” World Politics, Vol. 48 no.4 (August 1996), p.453-481.
50. Hu intentionally failed to mention any issue relative to reunification during the
two Pan-Blue leaders, Lien Chan’s and James Soong’s, visit to China in 2005. He then
shows that Beijing had strong national interests in promoting more peace with Taiwan
because war would only destroy the established economic order and generate too many
uncertainties, such as domestic instability, a military stalemate, and a potential war with
the United States.
51. Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan’s National Identity, Politics and the Prospect of Cross-
Strait Relations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44 no.4 (Spring 2004), p.484-512.
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manipulate a more pro-status quo mainland policy. The third case
relates to Taiwan’s decreasing defense expenses, and the United
States’ eroding support of Taiwan’s provocative mainland policy.
The Taiwan missile crisis offers a negative case showing that oppo-
site ideas on security concerns may initiate an imminent militarized
dispute, while the second case about Ma’s mainland policy and de-
creasing defense budget examine the positive effect security similar-
ities have on peace.
The Taiwan missile crisis began with President Lee’s visit to
Cornell University in June 1995. China was irritated by President
Clinton’s administration’s decision to grant a visa to Lee, as well as
Lee’s speech at Cornell. China was also concerned about the first
presidential election in Taiwan, which was scheduled for March of
the following year. China was suspicious of Lee’s real intentions
regarding the independence-unification issue, and was worried
about the prospect of Lee’s reelection.
Under the pressure of hawkish elements in the Chinese party-
state, in particular, the People’s Liberation Army, Chinese leader
JIANG Zemin decided to take tough actions.52 Thus, in July, China
announced that it would test its surface-to-surface missile program,
and it indeed fired missiles targeted at an area less than one hun-
dred miles from Taiwan’s coast. China also amassed a large num-
bers of troops in the Fujian province right across the Taiwan Strait
from Taiwan. China’s goal was to assert its sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity, and to show its determination.
The 1995 Taiwan missile crisis clearly informs us that once
China and Taiwan shift away from a mutual consensus on the main-
tenance of the status quo, there is a high probability that both sides
may engage in a serious militarized dispute.53 Both China and Tai-
wan have clearly recognized this issue, and it is the reason that dur-
ing the 2007-2008 presidential election campaign, the KMT
candidate MA Ying-jeou proposed a “modus vivendi” approach to
cross-Strait relations. This approach included “mutual non-denial”
and the “three-no’s,” including no unification, no independence,
52. Mdel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang argue that the military became outraged
and took initiative in pressing for a harsh response. Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo
Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner,
1998, p. 274–279.
53. Leaders on both sides of the Strait realized that this was a major theatrical
event, with each person playing a clearly defined role. Ji You, “Making Sense of War
Games in the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6 (1997), p. 287–305.
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and no use of force.54 The “three-no’s” policy could be viewed as
the principle choice for maintaining the status quo for both sides
because as long as Taiwan does not declare a de jure independence,
any use of force by China against Taiwan will be viewed as unneces-
sary and unjust. Beijing has already recognized mutual consensus
on the security preferences, and encourages both sides to return
back to the normal track of cross-Strait relations.
The so called “diplomatic truce” is one of President Ma’s suc-
cessful foreign policy achievements and represents a symbol of
peaceful development across the Strait. It has been a diplomatic
task for the Taiwanese government to expand its international
space, especially during the eras of former president LEE Tung-hui
and CHEN Shui-bian. During Lee and Chen’s administration, the
Taiwanese government believed increasing the number of diplo-
matic allies represented a successful foreign policy. However, after
President Ma was elected in 2008, China became the single most
significant factor determining the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic
allies. Several of Taiwan’s allies attempted to establish a diplomatic
relationship with China since May of 2008. For instance, China re-
jected pleas from Panama and Paraguay to establish diplomatic re-
lationships with Beijing in order to honor this special moment of
peace across the Taiwan Strait.55
From the discussion above, we are able to discover an intrigu-
ing fact. President Ma’s diplomatic truce has received some positive
responses from Beijing, and it is clear that the truce also has bene-
fits for China. Before May 2008, China launched several diplomatic
attacks against Taiwan, and Taiwan suffered dramatically from this
highly expensive diplomatic warfare on the maintenance of the alli-
ance balance. However, both Beijing and Taipei utilized the bene-
fits introduced by the security consensus to repair the dangerous
dyadic relationship. In fact, after President Ma’s “modus vivendi”
54. The three-no’s policy can be served as the foundation for the future negotiations
on cross-Strait issues. Unification is not acceptable to the majority of Taiwanese, while
independence will bring a disastrous situation for both sides. See Chen Edward I-hsin,
“The Security Dilemma in U.S.-Taiwan Informal Alliance Politics,” Issue and Studies,
Vol. 48 no.1 (March 2012), p.1-50.
55. Dean Chen, “The Strategic Implications of MA Ying-jeou’s ‘One ROC, Two
Areas’ Policy on Cross-Strait Relations.” Even Gambia decided to cut ties with Taiwan
on November 15th, 2013, and this break leaves Taiwan with only three diplomatic allies
in Africa now. China’s government said that Beijing had nothing to do with the decision
by the Gambia to terminate its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. See http://www.
wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=11&id=
20131116000124.
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approach, none of the 22 states that have formal diplomatic ties
with Taipei have defected to Beijing. In short, President Ma’s diplo-
matic truce, combined with a stable mainland policy, has success-
fully eased the tensions between China and Taiwan. The new
flexible and pragmatic foreign policy, which is entirely different
from the aggressive approach of the previous two presidents, has
allowed Ma to rebuild mutual trust and a stable relationship with
mainland China.
Aside from the mutual consensus on slowing the diplomatic
warfare, Taiwan and China seek far more similar security interests.
Taiwan, unlike Japan or India, could not afford increasing its own
efforts to balance against China’s growing power.56 Taiwan’s mili-
tary spending is entirely inadequate to meet the potential military
task it faces, suggesting that it either believes it has at least some
security commitment from the United States if China starts its coer-
cion, or it is pointless to resist China’s attack.57 Some of the
Taiwanese intellectuals continually focus on pleading for broader
coverage from the U.S., based on the interpretation of the 1979 Tai-
wan Relations Act. Nonetheless, there are strong suspicions that
the United States might fail to fulfill its commitment toward Tai-
wan.58 Since Taiwan does not have sufficient capability to balance
against China, there are some voices proclaiming that there is no
damage in turning to appease China, leaving their security at the
mercy of the Chinese leadership.59 Decreasing military competi-
tions introduces positive benefits for Taipei, and this type of secur-
ity similarity also attracts positive feedback from mainland China.
56. Justin Logan, “China, American, and the Pivot to Asia,” Policy Analysis, (Janu-
ary 2013), p. 2-27.
57. According to Logan, he points out one recent study from the RAND Corpora-
tion, which suggested that in the event of a war, China could potentially ground the
entire Taiwan Air Force before it could take off by cutting all of the runways at Tai-
wan’s fighter bases. Also, see David A. Shlapak et al., A Question of Balance: Political
Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute, Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2009.
58. The cross-Strait relations have been, and will continue to be asymmetric. The
power gap between China and Taiwan is enormous, and stability can hardly be main-
tained with arms sales alone. Thus, Taiwan’s fear of abandonment will be much greater
once the United States starts to decrease the amount of arms sales, or becomes even
more ambiguous on its cross-Strait policy. Taiwan may be afraid that the United States
will realign with China. Moreover, some observers adopt the standpoint that the United
States would not take a firm stance on any use of force by China against Taiwan. This
assumption, in turn, leads to a suspicion that the rise of China will eventually lead to
Taipei’s surrender.
59. Logan, “China, American, and the Pivot to Asia,” p. 13.
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The condition that constrains a small states foreign behavior is
power. Power preponderance will encourage the secondary states to
create more similar interests, and benign attitude against their
greater neighboring power. In order to support the arguments men-
tioned above, I compare the widening gap of power between China
and Taiwan in Figure 3, which contains both China and Taiwan’s
military expenditure as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) in percentages from 1995 to 2012.60 During President
Lee’s administration, military expenditure occupied a high percent-
age of GDP value in comparison to President Ma’s administration.
It has dropped from 4.2% in 1995 to 2.3% in 2012, and from 24.3%
of total government spending to 16.2% in the same period.61 After
MA Ying-jeou became president in May 2008, he has retained the
goal of defense budgets a little over 2% of the GPD, or about 16%
of total government spending. President Ma also cut Taiwan’s de-
fense budget in 2009, 2010, and 2011 before providing a one-time
increase in 2012.62 This informs us of one critical phenomenon: the
decline defense and military expenditures strengthened the strong
consensus for regional stability between Beijing and Taipei. At
least, President Ma and his administration made the first strategic
move in attempting to mitigate the binary rivalry, hoping to create a
more stable and longer lasting peace across the Taiwan Strait.
60. In the studies of international politics, scholars adopt military force as the repre-
sentative of a state’s effective powers. This is the reason why I use military expenditure
as a percentage of the GDP for the measurement of power. See John Mearsheimer’s
discussions in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 55~82.
61. Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990, Washington DC:
Congressional Research Service (July 3, 2013), p. 44.
62. Ibid., p. 43.When asked about Taiwan’s cuts in the defense budget during Presi-
dent Ma’s address to the United States on May 12, 2011, President Ma claimed that the
defense budget could not keep up with the rapid GDP growth. The Ma administration
has argued that defense spending is down temporarily due to factors such as the costs of
rebuilding after Typhoon Morakot in 2009. However, Taipei offers little revision before
Ma leaves office in 2016. The evidence above demonstrates that Ma’s administration
has plans for a lower national defense budget than previous presidents. See “Alarm
Over Taiwan Strait, Taiwan for both Taipei and Washington to shore up the island’s
deteriorating defenses.” The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB
10001424052702304448204579181054107049482
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Figure 3: PRC and ROC Military Expenditure of GDP (%)63
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In order to reduce cross-Strait tensions, the most efficient way
is to decrease the existence of military trade between Taiwan and
United States. Two pieces of evidence related to the U.S. security
assurance to Taiwan may support this argument. First, the decreas-
ing number of arms sales from the U.S. to Taiwan has constantly
disturbed and influenced Taiwan’s national defense. As indicated in
Figure 4, the amount of arms exports from Washington, D.C. has
declined since 1997.64 There was a slight increase in the amount of
arms sales during President Chen’s second term; however, the total
amount of arms trades have remained flat since 2007. Compared
with LEE Tung-hui and CHEN Shui-bian, President Ma has re-
ceived small amounts of military sales from the United States, espe-
cially during his first term (2008-2012). Recently, Taiwan’s defense
ministry issued a formal statement warning that by 2020 China will
be able to successfully invade the democratic island and fend off
63. Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. http://www.sipri.org/research/
armaments/milex/milex_database. Figures are in US $M., at constant 2011 prices and
exchange rates, except for the last figure, which is in US $M. at 2012 prices and
exchange rates
64. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis can be viewed as the main reason why there
was a peak in arms sales between the U.S. and Taiwan in 1997.
\\jciprod01\productn\A\AOP\14-2\AOP201.txt unknown Seq: 32 20-OCT-14 9:26
32 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
any foreign intervention.65 The insufficient military assistance may
increase the sense of insecurity, and also encourage some type of
accommodation strategy in Taiwan.
It reveals that even though American foreign policy today fa-
vors the U.S. and Taiwan’s positions and deters China’s use of force
against Taiwan, Washington focuses more on a peaceful resolution
of the Beijing-Taipei impasse.66 Unnecessary non-defensive weapon
systems transferred to Taiwan will only endanger the status quo
across the Strait. For instance, the U.S. has refused to sell Taiwan
new F-16 C/D fighter jets, let alone the stealth F-35. This leaves the
island with insufficient replacements for its ancient fleet of F-5s,
which is set for decommissioning in 2019. Furthermore, in 2012,
Washington agreed to upgrade the 145 F-16 A/B fighters that Tai-
wan bought in 1992, but the agreement of upgrading the F-16 A/B
fighters will not improve the planes with more advanced
capabilities.
Figure 4: Volume of Arms Exports from U.S. to Taiwan from
1995-2012 (in Million $)67
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65. “Alarm Over Taiwan Strait, Taiwan for both Taipei and Washington to shore up
the island’s deteriorating defenses.” The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702304448204579181054107049482
66. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, p. 170.
67. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Program. http://portal.sipri.org/publications/
pages/transfer/splash
Note: Figures are millions of SIPRI trend indicator values (TIVs) and cover deliveries
of major conventional weapons, as defined by SIPRI.
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As some Pentagon officials admit, military exchanges with Tai-
wan are riskier “in an environment of improving Taiwan-People’s
Republic of China ties.”68 In order to decrease the likelihood of a
U.S. conflict with China, the change in arms sales to Taiwan “would
remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the
U.S. and China, and smooth the way for better relations between
them in the decades to come.”69 Decreasing arms sales does not
only create more stability, but also fulfills both the U.S. and China’s
mutual security interests.
Additionally, an ambiguous security commitment from the
U.S. may discourage Taiwan from balancing against China, which
also offers certain significant effects on increasing political consen-
sus between China and Taiwan. The reason is, on the one hand, that
the United States intends to maintain heretofore-good relationships
with Taiwan, but on the other hand, given the growing ties between
the U.S. and China, Washington does not want to disrupt its stable
relationship with Beijing. It is beneficial for the U.S. if China and
Taiwan were to maintain the status quo in East Asia. The U.S. gov-
ernment has adopted “strategic ambiguity” as their basic principle
for handling cross-Strait affairs.
This type of ambiguity has changed gradually during President
Obama’s administration. Contrasted with the high points of U.S.
support for Taiwan during President George W. Bush’s term, the
Obama administration demonstrates more reluctance to face the
changing military imbalance between China and Taiwan. Adminis-
tration leaders today seem firm in efforts to deter China’s use of
force. The U.S. support for MA Ying-jeou’s rapprochement with
China is seen positively as sustaining conditions for an eventual
peaceful resolution.70
Alternatively, eroding support from the U.S. can be gleaned
from the current U.S. government’s level of attention towards Tai-
wan. There has been an important shift in Asia-Pacific regional dy-
namics under President Obama’s strategic structure. When
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke in Hawaii in October 2010,
Taiwan was not included in the landmark speech. This demonstrates
that the full extent of stronger U.S. engagement ranges across the
68. Kerry Dumbaugh, Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Recent Developments and Their Pol-
icy Implications, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (January 7, 2009), p.
18.
69. Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessi-
mism,” p. 87.
70. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, p. 171.
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entire Asia-Pacific region, from India to the Pacific Islands, but
does not include Taiwan. Taiwan has maintained a low public pro-
file during President Obama’s administration’s greater regional ac-
tivities.71 Based on the facts, there is an indication that eroding
support from the United States may gradually encourage future po-
litical and security cooperation between China and Taiwan.
V. COMMON ECONOMIC INTERESTS BETWEEN CHINA
AND TAIWAN
In addition to security interests and peace, scholars also find
that states with common economic interests have less severe dis-
putes.72 This section reviews some links between economic interests
and peace, arguing that if both states in a dyad pay attention to
capitalist interests, they are more likely to experience a perpetual
peace. In fact, if both states in a dyad focus on capitalism, including
state capitalism or a laissez-faire system, they all can be viewed with
similar economic similarity. These capitalist peace arguments in-
volve debates about whether free trade or open markets are posi-
tively related to world peace. Recent scholarly research has focused
on this important issue.73
The following is a brief discussion regarding the differences of
capitalist peace theories in international relations literature. The
root of capitalist peace can be traced to Erich Weede’s insight, built
on the classical economic theory, of how trade and economic rela-
tions between states create peace.74 Alternatively, Gartzke shifts
away from the traditional Kantian triad of international trade, de-
mocracy, and international organizations towards more economic
71. Ibid., p. 172. Not only the Obama’s administration, but the decline in congres-
sional support also influenced the U.S. security commitment. Sutter mentions that few
members of the House of Representatives actually visit Taiwan. Even though they visit
the island, Congress members offer an adverse view of Taiwan’s interests.
72. Maoz et al., “Structural Equivalence and International Conflict: A Social Net-
works Analysis,” p. 664.
73. For the discussion of capitalist peace theory, see Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist
Peace.” Erik Gartzke and Joseph J. Hewitt, “International Crises and the Capitalist
Peace.” Also, see Michael Mousseau, “The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Prefer-
ences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol 47 no.4 (December 2003), p. 483-510; and “The Social Market
Roots of Democratic Peace,” International Security, Vol. 33 no.4 (Spring 2009), p. 52-86;
and “Coming to Terms with the Capitalist Peace,” International Interactions, Vol. 36
no.2 (April 2010), p.185-213. Patrick McDonald, The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capital-
ism, the War Machine, and International Relations Theory, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press, 2009.
74. Weede, Economic Development, Social Order, and World Politics.
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attributes associated with capitalism and potentially competing
causes of peace.75 His findings remind us of an interesting principle:
democracy may make no significant and independent contribution
to peace; however, it is economic freedom associated with capital
openness, which encourages states to emphasize peace. Gartzke dis-
misses trade as a proper capitalist variable; instead, he adopts de-
velopment as well as market openness to represent the meaning of
capitalism.76 Gartzke’s arguments thus contribute to the supple-
ment of Kantian peace, and also move us beyond the polarized de-
bate that portrays capitalism as a source of conflict or peace.
When applying the theoretical arguments of capitalist peace to
East Asian studies, we discover that China has changed its national
interest from a communist ideology promising future gains in social
equality, to a more open economy with western capitalist values.77
This change enabled China to receive more foreign direct invest-
ment, private ownership, and competitive markets—all of which
propel economic expansion. Even though there are still debates and
doubts regarding China’s economic system, arguing that the eco-
nomic system of China is just a “partially marketized economy” in a
non-democratic country, economic reform and globalization moved
China’s economic interests in the direction of a more open-market.
Certainly, a decreased willingness to threaten economic growth has
led Beijing to embrace territorial restraint and multilateral coopera-
tion, which created more peaceful and constrained behavior with its
neighboring countries.78 We can argue that China’s intentions, and
75. Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” p.166-191.
76. As Gartzke notes, several mechanisms associated with capitalism are capable of
mitigating the causes of war. Please see  “The Capitalist Peace,” p.171. He uses the
Falklands War as an appropriate case elaborating how development can lead countries
to be more likely to engage in conflicts far from home. The British estimated the ex-
pected utility of projecting their naval forces overseas by winning the war, or aban-
doning their influence in South America to the Argentine government. Domestic
development and military technology strengthened the confidence of Thatcher’s
administration.
77. In McDonald, The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and
International Relations Theory.
78. For Beijing’s improved relations with its neighbors, see Allen Carlson, “Helping
to Keep the Peace: China’s Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Interven-
tion,” Pacific Affairs, (2004), p. 9-27. For the memberships of international organiza-
tions, see Margaret M. Pearson, China in Geneva: Lessons from China’s Early Years in
the World Trade Organization. New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy.
Robert S. Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston, Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press,
2006, p.242-275.
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the motivation to create a more peaceful investment environment,
are close to those capitalist peace states.
Furthermore, this study does not focus on debating whether
China is a full capitalist state. In contrast, I argue that China has a
peaceful characteristic similar to those capitalist peace states. The
priority of economic growth and open-market strategy carries im-
portant foreign policy implications. China reversed its communist
intentions, and expanded its relationship with the broader global
economy. China also embraced foreign investments and technology
to stimulate exports and economic growth. For instance, DENG
Xiaoping argued that a peaceful and developed society would boost
the Chinese economy while China’s grand strategy with the peace-
ful rise ideology also promotes a peaceful investment environment.
The issue of China’s peaceful rise was commented on by ZHENG
Bijian, a former principal of the Chinese Communist School, who
gave a speech at the Bo’au Forum in 2003. Zheng emphasized that
by continuing to implement reforms and open markets to foreign
investment, China would not follow the strategy of previous rising
powers, such as Germany and Japan.79 Neither would China seek to
destabilize the international system nor pursue territorial expan-
sion. In other words, China would mainly focus on domestic devel-
opment as well as economic cooperation with other countries.
Zheng also proposed that open global markets and capitalism
would help China formulate a new security concept, which seeks to
build mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation with other
states. Therefore, if the value of capitalism reformed the Chinese
security concept and also guided China’s new security diplomacy,
there may perhaps be a different atmosphere between China and
Taiwan.
Similarly, Taiwan has carried out its economic policy based on
the states’ interests. Economic policy will be more or less influ-
enced by security concerns. One example lies in the debate between
the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) regarding Taiwan’s mainland policy, especially as it relates to
all economic interactions with China.80 During LEE Tung-hui’s era,
79. Bijian Zheng, “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, 6
(2005), p.18-24.
80. This paper has also acknowledged that the cross-Strait relationship is not a two-
person game involving just the KMT and CCP. Some scholars argue that we should also
consider a third player, the DPP.  Consideration of the DPP may add some different
angles on relevant studies. However, as this paper begins with the international rela-
tions framework, I adopt the state as the level of analysis. In addition, there are still
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there was pressure by business groups to relax the “No haste, go
slow” policy towards mainland China. Business groups suffered
huge economic losses while the government closely tied its eco-
nomic interests with its political interests at that time. Even the
Democratic Progress Party’s mainland policy in the late 1990s fo-
cused on whether the party should support a pro-engagement
stance of “boldly moving westward” (toward the mainland) (dadan
xijin) or “strengthening our base and moving slowly” (qiangben
xijin).81 Economic issues have been tightly connected with states’
political and security concerns, and this reveals that Taiwan has had
an economy connected to national security since the economic
takeoff.82
An examination of China’s economy and its relationships with
Taiwan illustrates how economic interests impact both Beijing and
Taipei’s concerns in domestic politics and foreign policy decisions.
Though the Chinese government shows no intention of democratiz-
ing, and although Taiwan has experienced many years of coherent
democracy since 1992, the two political entities in this dyad have
maintained a peaceful bilateral relationship for the past 40 years.
The capitalist peace theory offers another useful theoretical expla-
nation for this type of stable situation. I outline two different mod-
els in the capitalist peace theory: the trade model and the capital
openness model. After utilizing these two capitalist models to inves-
tigate cross-Strait relations, it is easier to accept the third assump-
tion mentioned in this monograph.83
different perspectives about the economic cooperation with mainland China between
members of DPP, which came from different factions and divisions of power. These
types of divisions have weakened their opposition strength.
81. Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” The
China Journal, 53 (2005), p.35–60.
82. Not only Taiwan, but also South Korea has a strong states-intervened economy.
The South Korean government fully sponsored some symbolic entrepreneurs, such as
Hyundai, Samsung, Kia, and LG during the country’s economic takeoff. South Korea
adopts import subsidies, tax returns, and other import and export policies to help these
indigenous industries to develop. Taiwan can be another state-sponsored economy en-
tity in East Asia. In Huang Yasheng’s book, he mentions that during the Chiang Ching-
kuo era, the father of Taiwan’s economic miracle, Li Kuo-ting constantly exhorted his
government and leader to develop the information technology industry. Besides being a
government official, he also supported the country to develop the technology on plastic
(PVC), and eventually helped Mr. Wang Yong-ching to establish the first plastic com-
pany called Formosa Plastics.
83. Several key points need to be addressed before discussing the capitalist models.
First, whether the China-Taiwan dyad can be viewed as a capitalist dyad depends on
how the researcher defines the concept of capitalism. In other words, if a capitalist state
\\jciprod01\productn\A\AOP\14-2\AOP201.txt unknown Seq: 38 20-OCT-14 9:26
38 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
This study does not aim to analyze the directions of causal rela-
tions between capitalist economy and peace. Previous literature has
already sufficiently debated whether it is peace that causes more
trade or vice versa.84 Evidence has supported that trade (or other
liberal factors) leads to peace.85 Some critics claim that the subse-
quent accords signed by Taiwan with the mainland in the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) were a result of the
prior advent of peace, not its cause. However, we should not forget
that there have already been large amounts of trade and invest-
ments underway since the late 1990s across the Strait, which may be
viewed as the primogenitor of peace and economic cooperation be-
tween Beijing and Taipei. Thus, it is a huge endeavor to discover
the causal directions between trade and peace for the cross-Strait
relations.
I discovered that two free-market theories of capitalist peace
could explain why China and Taiwan can maintain a peaceful bilat-
eral relationship. The trade model (Weede) and the market open-
ness model (Gartzke) clearly group the China-Taiwan dyad as a
capitalist dyad, which is more likely to keep a peaceful relationship.
The trade model defines capitalism as trade dependency with high
levels of interdependence, causing both nations in a dyad to refrain
from using military force. Thus, whether the China-Taiwan dyad fits
into the trade model depends on whether these two countries have
high levels of trade interdependence. In fact, both China and Tai-
wan are closely connected to each other in trade. In 2010, the total
trade between Taiwan and China reached $112.88 billion USD. The
total Taiwanese investment in China came to $9.03 billion USD (for
the first eight months in 2010).86 Besides, in 2010, the volume of
direct exports from Taiwan to China reached $76.93 billion USD,
while direct imports reached $35.94 billion USD. The high level of
economic transactions urged the Taiwanese government to recon-
sider signing an economic cooperation framework with China. On
June 29, 2010, China and Taiwan signed the Economic Cooperation
is defined by trade or market-openness with less trade barrio, then the China-Taiwan
dyad has been moving slowly towards a more capitalist pair.
84. Regarding the directions between trade and peace, see Katherine Barbieri, “Ec-
onomic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict?” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 33 no.1 (February 1996), p. 29-49. Katherine Barbieri and Jack S.
Levy “Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade.”
85. Bruce M. Russett and John R. O’Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Inter-
dependence, and International Organizations.
86. See Mainland Affairs Council, “Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly,” Jan
27, 2011. http://www.mac.gov.tw.
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Framework Agreement (ECFA) in Chongqing, which covers 12
agreements concerning trade, tourism, and other matters crucial to
the interests of the Taiwanese people to prevent a deeper isolation
and deterioration of the regional economic integration.
It is clear that if “capitalist” dyads are defined as having close
trade interdependence, then this is an appropriate case. The trade
model also assumes that nations will fight only if the gains of war
are much greater than its costs. If China initiates an attack once
Taiwan claims de jure independence, most agree that the costs of
the war for China will be much higher than the potential gain be-
cause Taiwan is one of China’s top ten trading partners. Taiwanese
businesses have invested an estimated $150 billion in the mainland
since 1988. Thus, there is only a small possibility of conventional
war occurring in this dyad.
The second capitalist peace case in this monograph is the appli-
cation of the market openness model to the cross-Strait studies.
Whether the China-Taiwan dyad fits into the capital openness
model depends on whether both actors have comparatively open
markets to each other. In fact, both parties have attempted to adopt
lower trade barriers, and open markets for mutual business and ec-
onomic activities for the past couple of years. One of the applicable
supports is that after signing the ECFA, Beijing and Taipei reduced
the regulations on trade barriers. Among the three major areas, the
“early harvest” list of tariff concessions covers 539 Taiwanese prod-
ucts, and 267 Chinese products with three stages over a period of
two years. Both China and Taiwan could receive huge economic
benefits through the market openness strategy. On one hand, 108
Taiwanese goods received zero tariffs immediately, including 18 ag-
ricultural products.87 On the other hand, China would also receive
benefits estimated at $2.86 billion USD while Taiwan agreed to of-
fer wider access in seven areas, including banking and movies. From
the evidence above, Beijing and Taipei were pushing deregulatory
and tariff concessions when mutual cooperation increased. The pos-
sibility of large-scale military conflict has decreased sharply, even
after the market opened.
More importantly, the chance of militarized disputes with Tai-
wan decreased sharply as China transformed its economic structure
to a more capitalist system. We can see that no major militarized
87. Studies conducted by research institutions in Taiwan clearly indicate that, in
general, the conclusion of an ECFA is a clear benefit to Taiwan: It will boost exports,
encourage overseas Taiwanese businesses to invest in Taiwan, stimulate foreign direct
investment, and create job opportunities.
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disputes occurred after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis.
Even during the missile crisis, there was just minor tension between
Beijing and Taiwan with no major military casualties. This decrease
occurred because the similarity in capitalist ideology helped to pro-
mote peace by altering Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan in at least
two ways. First, a strategy of national development oriented around
economic reform and globalization has moved China’s foreign-pol-
icy interests in a more cooperative direction. A decreased willing-
ness to threaten economic growth has led Beijing to restrain its
provocative policy towards Taiwan. Increasing interests in a capital-
ist economy helped China adopt a more peaceful international posi-
tion, and allowed China to look forward to maintaining the status-
quo with the Taiwanese government. China does not want to have
any possibility of destroying its economic development by solving
the Taiwan issue with military activities.
Second, a deeper mutual understanding serves as a stabilizing
force on cross-Strait relations. This period of economic reform has
promoted a more moderate foreign-policy orientation from Beijing,
while creating a series of mechanisms by which it believes it can
influence domestic politics in Taiwan. One of the mechanisms in-
creasing Beijing’s confidence that Taiwanese leaders will not de-
clare independence is the fact that Taiwanese investors received
strong economic incentives to shift smaller businesses of labor-in-
tensive manufacturing to mainland China in the late 1980s. For ex-
ample, local governments in China actively invited Taiwanese
investors with incentives such as reduced taxes, cheap land, and less
government control. The free market system has tightly bridged
Taiwanese investors with local Chinese governments, and peaceful
cross-Strait relations are preferred by Taiwanese businesspersons.
Beijing can target economic incentives at politically important
constituencies, such as farmers in Taiwan, to bolster support for
politicians that Beijing sees as embracing policies consistent with its
interests. Capitalist ideology promotes peace by shifting the view
regarding the possible “China threat” maintained by some local
politicians and constituencies in Taiwan. By demonstrating an im-
age of a trade partner instead of a political competitor, mainland
China decreases the hazard of Taiwan declaring de jure indepen-
dence. In short, declaring independence will only bring a dangerous
outcome for the current status quo. The growth of Taiwanese in-
vestment in the mainland has created a powerful political lobby that
benefits from the status quo.
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The close economic dependence between China and Taiwan
and the hypothesized causal mechanisms focus on several sets of
factors, including the beneficiaries of mutual trade dependence,
such as Taiwanese local companies (private sector), and the govern-
ment (public officials). Groups that benefit from capitalist markets,
especially local consumers and business firms in Taiwan, should
lobby their public officials for open commercial policies, restrained
ideological claims, and peace. When a political dispute between
Beijing and Taipei threatens to provoke military conflict, the eco-
nomic interests of these domestic actors should lead them to pub-
licly oppose policies and government maneuvers that heighten the
risk of war. For instance, in the midst of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait
Missile Crisis, business groups, such as technology firms or tradi-
tional manufacturers from Taiwan, attempted to lobby political offi-
cials to avert war, or publicly voiced their support for a peaceful
compromise. Congressional officials in Taiwan, who represent such
interests, also opposed presidential maneuvers that hindered politi-
cal compromise with China. In addition, major investors in the local
stock market lobbied instead for aggressive foreign and cross-Strait
policies that heightened the risk of war. Importantly, politicians
who built stable bases of domestic support by embracing free trade
were more likely to embrace restrained policy choices. The out-
come of this domestic struggle between private sectors and govern-
ment officials played a critical role in the eventual decision over
whether to escalate, or peacefully settle international disputes.
It is true that when comparing the war-proneness of the Middle
East to the avoidance of major military disputes in the Far East
during the past few decades countries in East Asia focus more on
economic openness and cooperation, or what we call the free trade
system. While China still remains at a low level of democratic de-
velopment, economic cooperation and a free-market system pro-
vides more hope for the future than democratization. In fact, the
more countries trade with each other, the less likely military dis-
putes will occur between them.88 If the argument of capitalist peace
is robust and valid, then this theory may exert some pacifying im-
pact on the region as well as global order. The China-Taiwan dyad
may prefer using more peaceful resolutions in the future, if any mil-
itarized disputes occurred between these two political entities.
However, the qualifications of peace between great powers should
88. Erich Weede, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global
Harmony by Economic Interdependence,” International Interactions, Vol. 36 no.2
(April 2012), p. 206-213.
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put China’s economic situation into consideration. Possibly, it is ei-
ther cross-border investment, capital market integration, or even a
commitment to economic freedom that counts for capitalism, which
pacifies effectively.
VI. THE RAPIDLY GROWING RESISTANCE AGAINST
CHINA’S ECONOMIC COERCION IN TAIWAN AND THE
2014 SUNFLOWER STUDENT MOVEMENT
It would seem that China and Taiwan have accelerated their
economic cooperation after President Ma came into power. One of
the achievements made by Ma’s administration was the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Under the ECFA,
President Ma’s administration quickly pushed ahead the Cross-
Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) at the Legislative Yuan in
March 2014. The major goal of the CSSTA is to address major and
fundamental barriers to trade services affecting China and Taiwan,
and attempt to decrease unfair competition from state-owned en-
terprises, lack of transparency, and the business discrimination in
license permits. A trade service agreement has the potential to cre-
ate trading conditions that enable service industries to achieve their
full potential. President Ma believes that the CSSTA will be one of
the most important economic contributions he makes before com-
pleting his second term of presidency, which also provides deeper
economic cooperation, common economic interests, and perpetual
peace with mainland China.
However, domestic resistance against the CSSTA, which comes
from the serious split of society and the declination in the general
public’s confidence toward the government as a whole, created a
recent protest. Protesters extended their occupation of the Legisla-
tive Yuan chamber to the failure of occupation of the Executive
Yuan in late March 2014. Their major demand was for the Ma ad-
ministration to revoke the agreement, enact a mechanism in the
current legislative session to monitor the Legislative Yuan for any
cross-Strait agreements, and then review the CSSTA in this mecha-
nism. They also asked to subject it to a line-item-review and line-
item-vote. The protest turned into a dispute on procedure issues;
however, the real meaning of this protest has represented the split
views of society, and the lack of consensus built to set Taiwan’s fu-
ture economic strategy. The leaders of the student protesters even
argue that the existing agreements between China and Taiwan
would not be equipped with domestic law status, and should not be
reviewed and passed by the Legislative Yuan.
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As mentioned above, common security and economic interests
could create opportunities to boost deeper cooperation and peace
between China and Taiwan. When using this theoretical framework,
we use states as the unit of analysis. In the studies of international
relations, it becomes intuitive to use states as major actors in inter-
national society, therefore I adopted Beijing and Taipei as two sin-
gle international actors. The individual governments represent their
governmental interests, attempting to require the maximum bene-
fits for their civil society. International relations scholars have
widely recognized this approach.
It becomes a more sensitive and difficult conundrum to make
the theoretical argument perfect if we were to neglect the intensive
split voices in Taiwan’s domestic politics. One notable piece of evi-
dence supporting this phenomenon can be seen from the public
opinion about the issue of the CSSTA signed by China and Taiwan.
There are still diversified opinions regarding the signing of the
CSSTA, and further economic cooperation with mainland China.
As indicated in Table 1, about 40% of Taiwanese respondents are in
favor of CSSTA, while 39.6% of the respondents disagreed with it.
The divided public opinion demonstrates a clear split on this eco-
nomic issue, and seems to show a move towards a more polarized
trend. This is the reason why those student demonstrators in the
Sunflower Movement demanded a “Citizens’ Constitutional Con-
ference,” but the Ma administration rejected this idea.
Do you agree the signing of CSSTA with mainland China? (%)
Strongly Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree No Response Total
15.1 25.4 17.2 22.4
19.9 100
40.5 39.6
Table 1: Public Opinion on CSSTA in 201489
Even if Taiwan’s civil society and political elites have different
ideas about the CSSTA and regional economic integration, cross-
Strait relations may not be able to sustain a more peaceful develop-
ment if they are unable to attain some kind of sensible consensus as
to how the current dispute can be dealt with constructively. There-
fore, building a consensus on the economic and security issues, such
89. Survey data from National Development Council conducted in April 1st, 2014.
See http://www.ndc.gov.tw/m1.aspx?sNo=0060392#.VAR2LmSSyRE
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as the “1992 Consensus,” reflects a realistic consideration of shelv-
ing political and legal disputes for Taiwan’s government.
The academia and media in Taiwan realized that it is a critical
issue in retrospect to the original proclaim in the “1992 Consensus.”
Indeed, even though Beijing and Taipei have reached some “con-
sensus” during the negotiation and discussions of CSSTA in 2014, it
does not solve the ultimate question of Taiwan’s future. For in-
stance, all parties concerned in Taiwan should try their best to settle
down political stagnation, and look for shared common interests.
Political elites in Taiwan need to formulate a way to survive in the
wave of regional integration, and face rising China in order to cus-
tomize appropriate legislations and laws for Taiwan. To do so, polit-
ical parties must play down the importance of mutual differences in
politics, and endeavor to make some concessions in order to reach a
workable consensus that is acceptable for political cooperation.
The decision made regarding foreign policy is an extension of
domestic politics. Split domestic politics will create numerous ob-
stacles in the decision process of foreign affairs, burdening the ne-
gotiation process with pointless tasks and uncertainties. Putnam has
already reminded us to focus on the observation that domestic fac-
tors influence international affairs or vice versa. We need to seek
theories that integrate both spheres, accounting for the areas of en-
tanglement between them. The application of Putnam’s two-level
game theory (TLG) to the CSSTA case in 2014 represents an ap-
propriate case study.
The whole process and issues of the CSSTA can be viewed as a
typical two-level game. The top negotiators from the Ma adminis-
tration achieved an agreement with mainland China, and signed this
agreement with Beijing on June 21, 2013 in Shanghai. The bargain-
ing between the Kuomintang and Communists representatives,
leading to a tentative agreement, can be viewed as Level I. The
second level is the ratification procedure in Taiwan since the demo-
cratic system in Taiwan required a long and strict discussion on
every issue related to China. In general, international negotiations
will last for several rounds because there are likely to be prior con-
sultations and further bargaining at Level II (domestic ratification)
to hammer out an initial position for the Level I negotiations. The
problem for the CSSTA in 2013, and the following protests from
students and civil protestors, came from the in-transparent legisla-
tive procedure and political split. This is the weakness that the Ma
administration failed to solve.
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However, the failure of domestic ratification should not be
viewed as a fiasco for President Ma’s mainland China policy be-
cause any international negotiations will face obstacles and con-
straints whenever the procedure needs to go through the
democratic system. The formal constraint on the ratification process
is that since the identical agreement must be ratified by the
Taiwanese congress, a preliminary Level I agreement cannot be
amended at Level II without reopening the Level I negotiations. In
other words, final ratification can be simply passed or turned down,
and any modification can be simply viewed as a rejection unless
that modification is approved by all other parties to the agreement.
In the CSSTA case, even the Ma administration faced strong do-
mestic boycotts from the opposition party in congress; it still has
several strategic advantages and bargaining chips when facing the
economic inducement from Beijing in the future. The Ma adminis-
tration could wisely use the advantage offered by the political split
and stagnation to secure more national sovereignty and benefits if
the political elites would properly apply Putnam’s TLG in its en-
tirety. For instance, based on Putnam’s ideas, “the relative size of
the respective Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the
joint gains from the international bargain.” This means that the
smaller domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage while the
larger perceived win-set of negotiators may face strong challenges
from other Level I negotiators.90 Based on the arguments above,
Taiwan’s negotiation representatives and executive leaders could
clearly reveal the current political situations in Taiwan to Beijing,
and request an improved version of this agreement. The Ma admin-
istration, whose domestic position is relatively weak, should be able
to drive a better bargain with their international creditors, other
things being equal, than China who has a solid domestic standing.
The difficulties of winning congressional ratification by a winning
coalition can be exploited by Ma’s negotiators, and asking Beijing
to yield more benefits in the trade and service sectors. If President
Ma’s administration would like to make some achievements on the
signing of CSSTA, they may need to send out some signals to Beij-
ing requiring more benefits and time for a more attractive
condition.
90. Thomas Schelling also noted the same logic thirty years ago: “The power of a
negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions and meet de-
mands. . .When the U.S. Government negotiated with other governments. . .if the exec-
utive branch negotiated with other governments, with its position constrained by law. . .
then the executive branch has a firm position that is visible to its negotiator partners.”
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The democratic system in Taiwan also offers several advan-
tages for President Ma to push for the negotiation. Beijing realizes
that there are increasingly confronting challenges against the eco-
nomic integration associated with the aforementioned two-tiered
policy. Facing the increasing concern over economic integration
over the CSSTA from Taiwan, China might require more patience
in dealing with this type of opposition. Taiwan has a different politi-
cal regime from China, and this type of democratic system will in-
fluence the results of bilateral negotiations, since it is more
transparent in the policy-making process in Taiwan. Beijing has cer-
tain advantages during the negotiation process because China will
become merely one of the major factors impacting Taiwan’s eco-
nomic future, regardless of the CSSTA. China will play an immense
role when Taiwan attempts to join any regional economic coopera-
tion, and Taiwan will hardly be able to break away from mainland
China. Once Beijing realizes this point, it will help to improve
cross-Strait relations if Beijing could extend the whole negotiation
process, and release more economic concessions to Taipei. Releas-
ing more benefits in the CSSTA will be no loss for China; however,
it may mitigate some oppositional voices in Taiwan. Nevertheless, it
is time for Beijing to adopt a “no haste, be patient” policy.
In this regard, weaving the interest peace arguments with the
TLG provides a new theoretical framework when we study cross-
Strait relations. When we attempt to loosen the knot and reach a
more stable consensus between Beijing and Taipei, the most im-
mense undertaking that requires attention is the domestic political
split within Taiwan. How to manage the situation, and maintain
consensus between Level II political parties becomes the first prior-
ity for Taiwan’s politicians. Only after a more stable and progres-
sive development occurs between the two parties could Taiwan
introduce a consensus to put on hold the unification-independence
argument. It would help concerned groups and parties that are will-
ing to find a way to work on pressing economic and trade issues,
which are central to Taiwan’s prosperity and survival. The process
of forming such a consensus may be very difficult, but it deserves
immediate joint action.
VII. CONCLUSION
Applying the interest peace theories to cross-Strait relations
yields persuading results. An examination of this case study in
China’s economy and its relationship with Taiwan illustrates how
economic interest affects both Beijing and Taipei’s domestic politics
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concerns and foreign policy decisions. I chose this dyad because
even though China shows no intention of democratizing, and Tai-
wan has experienced many years of “coherent” democracy since
1992, the two political entities still have maintained a peaceful bilat-
eral relationship for the past 40 years. From 1960 to 2000, only one
militarized interstate dispute occurred between China and Taiwan,
and it did not result in any fatalities. Thus, we need to examine a
case study of China’s economy illustrating how economic interests
might affect both Beijing and Taipei’s domestic political concerns
and foreign policy decisions. It is the presence of economic inter-
ests, which have some effect in reducing the number of large scale
militarized disputes between these two countries.
If we apply these arguments above into a regional study, espe-
cially in East Asia, we will find that the Sino-American dyad or
even the China-Taiwan dyad, which have demonstrated strong and
growing economic ties, need not wait for regime similarity, democ-
ratization, or other political agreements to maintain dyadic peace.
China’s positive response to the economic development in the
world market and its lack of readiness for a regime change based on
Western democratic values also shows the feasibility of economic
interest similarity. Thus, democratic peace becomes a less achieva-
ble goal for China now. If this is the case, then both leaders in Tai-
wan and the United States should reconsider the importance of
economic and security preferences rather than other political ideas
to change the domestic and international atmosphere in East Asia.
When we apply the importance of interest to the studies of
cross-Strait relations, it cautiously reminds us that there are still
some questions to utilizing a single-actor model to represent the
complexity of Taiwan’s interest. The ruling party Kuomintang has
eagerly progressed a more pro-China strategy while the opposition
party Democratic Progressive Party still plays a successful role con-
taining the government. The political tug-of-war increasingly po-
larizes the people and society in Taiwan. Therefore, we need to
dedicate more energy and time to future projects regarding cross-
Strait relations discussing interests from the competing parties, lo-
cal government officials, or the voices from political elites. Only
through careful illustrations with multiple dimensions of Taiwan’s
interests can we realize how interest similarity leaves a pacifying
effect on the cross-Strait.
The notions of mutual interests also have strong influences on
the rising China issue. China’s recent leaders have largely aban-
doned Marxist economics and vigorously embraced capitalism and
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more open markets in an attempt to modernize. In China, the West
confronts not an expansionist regime driven by a fundamentally dif-
ferent ideology but a growing power governed by a variant of Asian
authoritarianism. Certainly, China has given no indication that it
seeks to export its particular form of government by force. Indeed,
China seems prepared to learn from the West in the economic
realm. In other words, politicians in China are attempting to imitate
and learn the system the West prefers. If this is the case, both the
United States and Taiwan need to adjust their policy toward Beij-
ing. Discovering the mutual benefits on either economic or security
with mainland China becomes the priority. For instance, the United
States must pay careful attention to the issue of Taiwan, especially
since Taiwan is apt to become an increasingly thorny issue as the
regional balance of power shifts toward China. Taiwan cannot af-
ford to incite Beijing with a declaration of independence. Such an
act might provoke an attack by the mainland and endanger the sup-
port the United States and its allies extend to Taiwan. Deterrence
by the West has a role to play in allowing this situation to be settled
peacefully, but only in combination with a policy of engagement
and respect for China’s territorial integrity. This is the place where
interest similarity could play a crucial role.
China and Taiwan have consistently become more economic
interdependent. To maintain these interests from investors and
traders, both sides will have to remain this regional economy, with
the constraining links of interdependence that entails, and not be-
come a military threat to each other. In fact, the more commercial
benefits given by trade or other economic activities, the harder it
will be for China and Taiwan to reverse direction. This makes it
unlikely that China will choose confrontation, and Taiwan would
provoke China. All in all, this is an area into which the interest
similarity and cross-Strait relations should be pushed.
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Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Chinese Law (Hungdah
CHIU), 22 pp. $3.00
No. 3 - 1989 (92) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-02-8
One Step Forward, One Step Back, Human Rights in the People’s Re-
public of China in 1987/88 (John F. Cooper and Ta-ling LEE), 140
pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 1989 (93) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-03-6
Tibet:  Past and Present (Hungdah CHIU and June Teufel Dreyer), 25
pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1989 (94) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-04-4
Chinese Attitude toward International Law of Human Rights in the
Post-Mao Era (Hungdah CHIU), 38 pp. $4.00
No. 6 - 1989 (95) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-05-2
Tibet to Tiananmen:  Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign
Policy (W. Gary Vause), 47 pp. $4.00
1990 Series
No. 1 - 1990 (96) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-06-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Hungdah
CHIU), 20 pp. (Please order No. 5-1992 (112) for a revised version
of this issue) $3.00
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No. 2 - 1990 (97) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-07-9
Tiananmen:  China’s Struggle for Democracy—Its Prelude, Develop-
ment, Aftermath, and Impact (Winston L. Y. Yang and Marsha L.
Wagner), 314 pp.  Index (paperback out of print) $8.00
(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and
Politics Series, No. 11, ISBN 0-925153-08-7) $14.00
No. 3 - 1990 (98) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-09-5
Nationality and International Law in Chinese Perspective (Hungdah
CHIU), 37 pp. $4.00
No. 4 - 1990 (99) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-10-9
The Taiwan Relations Act after Ten Years (Lori Fisler Damrosch),
27 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1990 (100) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-11-7
The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations (Hungdah
CHIU), 34 pp. (out of print) $4.00
No. 6 - 1990 (101) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-12-5
Taiwan’s Recent Elections:  Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (John F.
Copper), 174 pp. Index (out of print) $8.00
1991 Series
No. 1 - 1991 (102) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-13-3
Legal Aspects of Investment and Trade with the Republic of China (Ed-
ited by John T. McDermott, with contributions by Linda F. Powers,
Ronald A. Case, Chung-Teh LEE, Jeffrey H. Chen, Cheryl M.
Friedman, Hungdah CHIU, K.C. Fan and Douglas T. Hung), 94 pp.
$6.00
No. 2 - 1991 (103) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-14-1
Failure of Democracy Movement:  Human Rights in the People’s Re-
public of China, 1988/89 (Ta-ling LEE and John F. Copper), 150 pp.
Index $10.00
No. 3 - 1991 (104) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-15-X
Freedom of Expression:  The Continuing Revolution in Japan’s Legal
Culture (Lawrence W. Beer), 31 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1991 (105) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-16-8
The 1989 US-Republic of China (Taiwan) Fisheries Negotiations (Mark
Mon-Chang Hsieh), 84 pp. $6.00
No. 5 - 1991 (106) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-17-6
Politics of Divided Nations:  China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam —
Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development (Ed-
ited by Quansheng ZHAO and Robert Sutter), 198 pp. Index $12.00
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No. 6 - 1991 (107) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-18-4
Lawyers in China:  The Past Decade and Beyond (Timothy A. Gelatt),
49 pp. $5.00
1992 Series
No. 1 - 1992 (108) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-19-2
Judicial Review of Administration in the People’s Republic of China
(Jyh-pin FA & Shao-chuan LENG), 37 pp. $5.00
No. 2 - 1992 (109) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-20-6
China’s Ministry of State Security:  Coming of Age in the International
Arena (Nicholas Eftimiades), 24 pp. $4.00
No. 3 - 1992 (110) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-21-4
Libel Law and the Press in South Korea:  An Update (KYU Ho Youm),
23 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1992 (111) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-22-2
Tiananmen Aftermath:  Human Rights in the People’s Republic of
China, 1990 (John F. Copper and Ta-ling LEE), 133 pp.  Index $15.00
No. 5 - 1992 (112) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-23-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Revised ver-
sion of No. 1-1990 (96)) (Hungdah CHIU), 37 pp. $4.00
No. 6 - 1992 (113) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-24-9
China’s Criminal Justice System and the Trial of Pro-Democracy Dissi-
dents (Hungdah CHIU), 21 pp. $3.00
1993 Series
No. 1 - 1993 (114) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-25-7
Can One Unscramble an Omelet?  China’s Economic Reform in Theory
and Practice (Yuan-li WU and Richard Y. C. Yin), 34 pp. $4.00
No. 2 - 1993 (115) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-26-5
Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on
Taiwan (With Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 61 pp. $6.00
No. 3 - 1993 (116) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-27-3
Sheltering for Examination (Shourong Shencha) in the Legal System of
the People’s Republic of China (Tao-tai HSIA and Wendy I.
Zeldin), 32 pp. $4.00
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No. 4 - 1993 (117) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-28-1
In Making China Modernized:  Comparative Modernization between
Mainland China and Taiwan (Wen-hui TSAI), 281 pp.  Index (out
of print, please order No. 5 - 1996 for 2nd ed.) $18.00
No. 5 - 1993 (118) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-30-3
Hong Kong’s Transition to 1997:  Background, Problems and Prospects
(with Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 106 pp. $7.00
No. 6 - 1993 (119) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-31-1
Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (with Documents) (Hungdah
CHIU), 69 pp. (out of print) $5.00
1994 Series
No. 1 - 1994 (120) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-32-X
Statutory Encouragement of Investment and Economic Development in
the Republic of China on Taiwan (Neil L. Meyers), 72 pp. $7.00
No. 2 - 1994 (121) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-33-8
Don’t Force Us to Lie:  The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Re-
form Era (Allison Liu Jernow), 99 pp. $7.00
No. 3 - 1994 (122) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-34-6
Institutionalizing a New Legal System in Deng’s China (Hungdah
CHIU), 44 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1994 (123) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-35-4
The Bamboo Gulag:  Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China,
1991-1992 (Ta-ling LEE & John F. Copper), 281 pp.  Index $20.00
No. 5 - 1994 (124) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-36-2
Taiwan’s Legal System and Legal Profession (Hungdah CHIU and
Jyh-pin FA), 22 pp. $3.00
No. 6 - 1994 (125) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-37-0
Toward Greater Democracy:  An Analysis of the Republic of China on
Taiwan’s Major Elections in the 1990s (Wen-hui TSAI), 40 pp. $6.00
1995 Series
No. 1 - 1995 (126) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-38-9
Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of Chile
(Herman Gutierrez B. and Lin CHOU), 31 pp. $5.00
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No. 2 - 1995 (127) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-39-7
The Tibet Question and the Hong Kong Experience (Barry Sautman
and Shiu-hing LO), 82 pp. $10.00
No. 3 - 1995 (128) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-40-0
Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial
Army:  Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility?
(David Boling), 56 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1995 (129) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-41-9
The Role of the Republic of China in the World Economy (Chu-yuan
CHENG), 25 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1995 (130) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-42-7
China’s Economy after Deng:  A Long-Term Perspective (Peter C.Y.
Chow), 43 pp. $5.00
No. 6 - 1995 (131) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-43-5
An Entreprenurial Analysis of Opposition Movements (Ching-chane
HWANG), 179 pp. Index $18.00
1996 Series
No. 1 - 1996 (132) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-44-3
Taiwan’s 1995 Legislatiave Yuan Election (John F. Copper), 39 pp. $6.00
No. 2 - 1996 (133) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-45-1
Russian-Taiwanese Relations:  Current State, Problems, and Prospects
of Development (Peter M. Ivanov), 76 pp. $10.00
No. 3 - 1996 (134) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-46-X
Recent Relations between China and Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Ca-
pabilities (Hungdah CHIU & June Teufel Dreyer), 28 pp. $4.00
No. 4 - 1996 (135) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-47-8
Intellectual Property Protection in the Asian-Pacific Region:  A Com-
parative Study (Paul C. B. Liu & Andy Y. Sun), 183 pp. Index. $25.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-48-6) $32.00
No. 5 - 1996 (136) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-49-4
In Making China Modernized:  Comparative Modernization between
Mainland China and Taiwan (2nd ed.) (Wen-hui TSAI), 297 pp.
Index. $30.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-50-8) $37.00
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No. 6 - 1996 (137) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-51-6
A Study of the Consular Convention between the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 68 pp.
$6.00
1997 Series
No. 1 - 1997 (138) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-52-4
Tiananmen to Tiananmen, China under Communism 1947-1996
(Yuan-Li WU), 348 pp.  Index $35.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-53-2) $45.00
No. 2 - 1997 (139) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-54-0
The External Relations and International Status of Hong Kong (TING
Wai), 72 pp. $8.00
No. 3 - 1997 (140) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-55-9
Sheltering for Examination (Shoushen) in the People’s Republic of
China:  Law, Policy, and Practices (Kam C. WONG), 53 pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 1997 (141) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-56-7
Legal Aid Practices in the PRC in the 1990s — Dynamics, Contents and
Implications, (LUO Qizhi) 68 pp. $8.00
No. 5 - 1997 (142) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-57-5
The KMT’s 15th Party Congress:  The Ruling Party at a Crossroads
(John F. Copper), 38 pp. $5.00
No. 6 - 1997 (143) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-58-3
From Pirate King to Jungle King:  Transformation of Taiwan’s Intellec-
tual Property Protection (Andy Y. Sun), 138 pp. $18.00
1998 Series
No. 1 - 1998 (144) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-59-1
From “Multi-System Nations” to “Linkage Communities”:  A New
Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations
(Yung WEI), 20 pp. $4.00
No. 2 - 1998 (145) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-60-5
The Impact of the World Trade Organization on the Lack of Trans-
parency in the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 63 pp.
$7.00
No. 3 - 1998 (146) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-61-3
The Nationalist Ideology of the Chinese Military (Xiaoyu CHEN), 45
pp. $6.00
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No. 4 - 1998 (147) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-62-1
Convergence and the Future of Reunification between Mainland China
and Taiwan:  A Developmental View (Wen-hui TSAI), 33 pp. $5.00
No. 5 - 1998 (148) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-63-X
Chinese Patent Law and Patent Litigation in China (Xiang WANG),
61 pp. $8.00
No. 6 - 1998 (149) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-64-8
The Development of Banking in Taiwan:  The Historical Impact on Fu-
ture Challenges (Lawrence L.C. Lee), 39 pp. $6.00
1999 Series
No. 1 - 1999 (150) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-65-6
An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T’iaoyutai Islets
(Senkaku Gunto) (Hungdah CHIU), 27 pp. $6.00
No. 2 - 1999 (151) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-66-4
Taiwan’s 1998 Legislative Yuan, Metropolitan Mayoral and City Coun-
cil Elections:  Confirming and Consolidating Democracy in the Re-
public of China (John F. Copper), 53 pp. $7.00
No. 3 - 1999 (152) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-67-2
The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute:  Its History and an Analysis of
the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan
(Han-yi SHAW), 148 pp. (out of print) $20.00
No. 4 - 1999 (153) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-68-0
Election and Democracy in Hong Kong:  The 1998 Legislative Council
Election (Shiu-hing LO & Wing-yat YU), 68 pp. $9.00
No. 5 - 1999 (154) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-69-9
The ROC on the Threshold of the 21st Century:  A Paradigm Reexam-
ined (Edited by Chien-min CHAO & Cal Clark), 189 pp. $24.00
No. 6 - 1999 (155) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-70-2
Party Primaries in Taiwan:  Trends, Conditions, and Projections in Can-
didate Selection (Julian Baum and James A. Robinson), 39 pp. $6.00
2000 Series
No. 1 - 2000 (156) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-71-0
United States-Taiwan Relations:  Twenty Years after the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act (Edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang & William W. Boyer),
309 pp. Index. $28.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-72-9) $42.00
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No. 2 - 2000 (157) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-73-7
Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election:  Consoli-
dating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics
(John F. Copper), 66 pp. $9.00
No. 3 - 2000 (158) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-74-5
Legal Eligibility of Taiwan’s Accession to GATT/WTO (CHO Hui-
Wan), 22 pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 2000 (159) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-75-3
Russia’s Northeast Asia Policy:  Challenges and Choices for the 21st
Century (Sharif M. Shuja), 22 pp. $6.00
No. 5 - 2000 (160) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-76-1
East Asia and the Principle of Non-Intervention:  Policies and Practices
(Linjun WU), 39 pp. $7.00
No. 6 - 2000 (161) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-77-X
The Association of South East Asian Nations’ Confidence and Security
Building with the People’s Republic of China:  Internal Constraints
and Policy Implications (Kwei-Bo HUANG), 61 pp. $9.00
2001 Series
No. 1 - 2001 (162) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-78-8
Socio-economic Changes and Modernization in an Age of Uncertainty:
Taiwan in the 1990s and Its Future Challenge (Wen-hui TSAI),
35 pp. $7.00
No. 2 - 2001 (163) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-79-6
Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act:  An Examination after
Twenty Years (Edited by Hungdah CHIU, Hsing-wei LEE and
Chih-Yu T. WU), 267 pp. $27.00
No. 3 - 2001 (164) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-80-X
The Diplomatic War between Beijing and Taipei in Chile (Lin CHOU),
61 pp. $9.00
No. 4 - 2001 (165) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-81-8
Reforming the Protection of Intellectual Property: The Case
of China and Taiwan in Light of WTO Accession
(Andy Y. Sun), 46 pp. $8.00
No. 5 - 2001 (166) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-82-6
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in China (Vai Io LO), 26 pp. $6.00
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No. 6 - 2001 (167) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-83-4
Building a Democratic State in Modernizing Taiwan:  The 2001 Legisla-
tive Election and the Push for Pluralism (Wen-hui TSAI and
George P. Chen), 24 pp. $6.00
2002 Series
No. 1 - 2002 (168) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-84-2
United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea:  A Study
of Ocean Law and Politics (Yann-huei SONG), 321 pp. $35.00
No. 2 - 2002 (169) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-85-0
The Politics of Racial Discrimination in Hong Kong (Barry Sautman
and Ellen Kneehans), 83 pp. (out of print) $10.00
No. 3 - 2002 (170) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-00-3
The Social and Political Bases for Women’s Growing Political Power in
Taiwan (Cal Clark and Janet Clark), 40 pp. $7.00
No. 4 - 2002 (171) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-01-1
The U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement: A Bridge for Economic Inte-
gration in the Asia-Pacific Region (Peter C.Y. Chow), 62 pp. $9.00
2003 Series
No. 1 - 2003 (172) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-02-X
Bringing People Back In: Collected Essays on Major Elections in Tai-
wan at the Turn of the 21st Century (Wen-hui TSAI), 125 pp. $18.00
No. 2 - 2003 (173) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-03-8
Taiwan: The Commercial State (Arthur I. Cyr), 81 pp. (out of print,
please order No. 1 - 2005 (180) for a revised version of this issue)
$10.00
No. 3 - 2003 (174) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-04-6
New Rules to the Old Great Game:  An Assessment of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization’s Proposed Free Trade Zone (Leland
Rhett Miller), 25 pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 2003 (175) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-05-4
The Republic of China Legislative Yuan:  A Study of Institutional
Evolution (Thomas J. Bellows), 35 pp. $7.00
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2004 Series
No. 1 - 2004 (176) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-06-2
Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Demoracy’s
Consolidation or Devolution? (John F. Cooper), 80 pp. $10.00
No. 2 - 2004 (177) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-07-0
Peace, Reunification, Democracy and Cross-Strait Relations (Zhaohui
HONG and Yi SUN), 16 pp. $5.00
No. 3 - 2004 (178) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-08-9
Judicial Discretion in Dispensing with the Service of Process Require-
ment in Hong Kong under Order 45, Rule 7(7): Moving towards a
Doctrine? (Simon Teng), 27 pp. $7.00
No. 4 - 2004 (179) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-09-7
Taiwan’s 2004 Legislative Election:  Putting it in Perspective (John F.
Copper), 75 pp. $13.00
2005 Series
No. 1 - 2005 (180) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-10-0
Taiwan: The Commercial State (revised version of No. 2-2003 (173))
(Arthur I. Cyr), 81 pp. $13.00
No. 2 - 2005 (181) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-11-9
Retracing the Triangle: China’s Strategic Perceptions of Japan in the
Post-Cold War Era (Danielle F. S. Cohen), 74 pp. $13.00
No. 3 - 2005 (182) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-12-7
Putting Things into Perspective: The Reality of Accountability in East
Timor, Indonesia and Cambodia (Suzannah Linton), 90 pp. $13.00
No. 4 - 2005 (183) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-13-5
Taiwan and the Soviet Bloc, 1949-1991 (Czeslaw Tubilewicz), 85 pp. $13.00
2006 Series
No. 1 - 2006 (184) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-14-3
Japan’s Changing Security Policy: An Overall View (Sharif Shuja),
32 pp. $7.00
No. 2 - 2006 (185) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-15-1
China in ASEAN-LED Multilateral Forums (Serene Hung),
102 pp. $14.00
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No. 3 - 2006 (186) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-16-X
East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, the West, and
“Colonialism” in Africa (Barry Sautman and YAN Hairong),
77 pp. (out of print) $13.00
No. 4 - 2006 (187) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-17-8
Taiwan’s 2006 Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections and
the Politics of Corruption (John F. Copper), 65 pp. $12.00
2007 Series
No. 1 - 2007 (188) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-18-6
National Identity, Ethnic Identity, and Party Identity in Taiwan (Chang-
Yen TSAI), 34 pp. $8.00
No. 2 - 2007 (189) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-19-4
Combating Corruption Singapore-Style: Lessons for Other Asian Coun-
tries (Jon S.T. Quah), 56 pp. $12.00
No. 3 - 2007 (190) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-20-8
The Status of Customary International Law, Treaties, Agreements and
Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Law of the Republic of
China on Taiwan (Hungdah CHIU and Chun-I CHEN), 31 pp. $8.00
No. 4 - 2007 (191) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-21-6
Rape Myths in American and Chinese Laws and Legal Systems: Do
Tradition and Culture Make the Difference? (Marietta Sze-chie
Fa), 109 pp. $16.00
2008 Series
No. 1 - 2008 (192) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-22-4
Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election:  Maturing
Democracy (John F. Copper), 90 pp. $15.00
No. 2 - 2008 (193) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-23-2
The Political Economy of South Korea:  Economic Growth, Democrati-
zation, and Financial Crisis (Uk HEO, Houngcheul JEON, Hayam
KIM and Okjin KIM), 24 pp. $7.00
No. 3 - 2008 (194) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-24-0
Korean Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Security, Economics, or
International Law? (Terence Roehrig), 59 pp. $12.00
No. 4 - 2008 (195) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-25-9
Evolving On-Line Empowerment: The Manchu Identity Revival Since
the 1980s (BAI Lian), 48 pp. $10.00
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2009 Series
No. 1 - 2009 (196) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-26-7
Taiwan at a Turning Point (Edited by Seyom Brown, Cal Clark, Hiroki
Takeuchi, and Alex Tan), 98 pp. $18.00
No. 2 - 2009 (197) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-27-5
The Background, Principles and Core Contents of the Real Right Law
of The People’s Republic of China (ZHU Yan), 39 pp. $8.00
No. 3 - 2009 (198) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-28-3
“All that Glitters Is Not Gold”: Tibet as a Pseudo-State (Barry
Sautman), 86 pp. $15.00
No. 4 - 2009 (199) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-29-1
Positive Equilibrium in U.S.-China Relations: Durable or Not? A time
of “testing” in Sino-American Relations (Robert Sutter), 52 pp.
$12.00
2010 Series
No. 1 - 2010 (200) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-30-5
An Insight into Insider Trading in Greater China (Greg Tzu Jan Yang),
61 pp. $14.00
No. 2 - 2010 (201) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-31-3
Taiwan’s Anti-Corruption Strategy: Suggestions for Reform (Jon S.T.
Quah), 111 pp. $18.00
No. 3 - 2010 (202) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-32-1
The East Asia Summit and the Regional Security Architecture (Ralf
Emmers, Joseph Chinyong Liow, and See Seng TAN), 52 pp. $12.00
No. 4 - 2010 (203) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-33-X
Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitan City Elections: An Assessment of Taiwan’s
Politics and a Predictor of Future Elections (John F. Copper),
67 pp. $15.00
2011 Series
No. 1 - 2011 (204) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-34-8
Legal Aid and the Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China
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